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ABSTRACT: American public law has no answer to the question of how a
court should evaluate the president's assertion of statutoy authority. In this
Article, I develop an answer by making two arguments. First, the same
framework of judicial review should apply to claims of statutory authority
made by the president and federal administrative agencies. This argument
rejects the position that the president's constitutional powers should shape
the question of statutory interpretation presented when the president claims
that a statute authorizes his actions. Once statutory review is separated from
consideration of the president's constitutional powers, the courts should
insist, as they do for agencies, that the president's actions bejustified by an
identifiable statutory authorization. The statutory president, I suggest, is
subject to administrative law.
Second, within the framework of judicial review applicable to agencies, the
president's claims of statutory authority should receive deference under the
rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. The president's accountability, visibility, and the transparency of
presidential orders provide strong grounds for applying Chevron deference
to the president's assertions of statutory authority. This theory thus
emphasizes the role of Congress in defining the boundaries of presidential
power, while according deference to the president's interpretations of
ambiguities within those boundaries. In this way, it structures the judicial
role to demand that political accountability be the basis for political power.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I
am grateful to David Franklin, Michael Herz, Harold Krent, and Stewart Sterk for their
generous comments on earlier drafts. A draft of this Article was presented at the 2004
Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum at Yale Law School. I am grateful to John Manning, who
commented on the paper at the Forum, for his many helpful suggestions, as well as to the other
participants for their responses. I thank Matthew Grieco, Sara Klein, and Jenna Sunderland-
Barresi for valuable research assistance, and the Benjamin N. Cardozo Faculty Research Fund
for support. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Presidents shape our national life. In executive orders and other written
directives, presidents have declared a nationwide freeze on wages and prices;
established major agencies such as the EPA, the Peace Corps, and the Office
(now Department) of Homeland Security; mandated nondiscrimination and
affirmative action programs for the vast portions of the economy engaged in
government contracting; suspended private legal claims against foreign
governments in domestic courts; established military tribunals; ordered that
an American citizen captured in Chicago be subject to military jurisdiction;
and initiated federal funding for faith-based organizations.'
As a legal basis for these orders, presidents have asserted statutory as
well as constitutional authority.2 American public law, however, has no
answer to the question of how a court should evaluate the president's
assertions of statutory authority. Although judicial review of whether a
president's action exceeds the authority granted by statute is available,' the
Supreme Court has not developed a framework determining how a court
should review a president's claim of statutory authority. Justice Jackson's
familiar three-part categorization of presidential power in his concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawryer offers a framework for
constitutional review of presidential action but is silent on how a court is to
judge when a president acts "pursuant to" a statute.5 Subsequent decisions
have provided no resolution.
This uncertainty has high costs. The absence of a framework for review
of presidential assertions of statutory authority does nothing to check the
incentives of the president and his counsel to seek the widest possible
construction of the president's authority. While wide constructions are not
in themselves objectionable, without oversight from other actors, they pose
the risks associated with the concentration of power. Moreover, Congress-
1. The citations for these orders appear in note 26 infra.
2. See infra note 26 (providing examples of executive orders that asserted statutory and
constitutional authority).
3. The Supreme Court has held that judicial review of the president's statutory actions
for abuse of discretion is not available under the Administrative Procedure Act, Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992), or more generally when a statute commits a
decision to the president's discretion. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1994). But, as
discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 59-72, judicial review of whether the president's
actions have statutory authorization is available. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 667
(1981) (reviewing whether the president's actions were beyond his statutory and constitutional
powers); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1327-32 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that
review of the legality of presidential action is available); cf Dalton, 511 U.S. at 474 (assuming
review of some claims that the president violated a statutory mandate is available, and citing
Dames & Moore).
4. 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson,J., concurring).
5. Id. at 635-36.
HeinOnline  -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 541 2004-2005
90 IOWA LAWREVIEW
one potential source of constraint and oversight-has been a less than
robust monitor of the president's assertions of statutory authority. The
incentives for Congress to delegate authority broadly have been well
documented.6  But despite the breadth of congressional delegations
generally, and delegations to the president in particular, Congress has
provided scant formal policing of the president's own assertions of authority
under those delegations. Between 1945 and 1998, Congress legislatively
7
overturned only four of the more than 3,500 executive orders issued. For a
wide range of institutional reasons, from constituent-driven pressures to the
costs attendant to coordinated action, Congress is a poor source of
constraint on presidential action.8 The judiciary thus has a critical role to
play in monitoring presidential compliance with statutory authority and
requires a theory of review to do so.
This Article aims to develop such a theory. Specifically, this Article
argues that the same framework ofjudicial review should apply to assertions
of statutory authority by the president and federal agencies. It challenges the
idea judicial review of the president's claims of statutory authorization
should be influenced by whether the Constitution independently authorizes
the president's actions. The president as a statutory actor-what I call the
statutory president-is subject to administrative law on the same terms as
agencies. Next, this Article argues that within the agency framework, courts
should grant deference under Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.9 to the president's claims of statutory authorization.
6. See, e.g., DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 101 (1990)
(arguing that legislators delegate to insulate themselves from political accountability); DAVID
EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATED POWERS 29-33, 48-85 (1999) (summarizing
empirical literature on congressional incentives to delegate broad powers, and developing a
transaction-cost model to explain incentives to delegate); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 80-87 (1991) (summarizing empirical and public choice explanations
of congressional incentives to delegate); Morris Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control,
and the Delegation ofLegislative Power, 2J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 43-46 (1986) (providing a model of
the legislative choice to delegate to the judiciary or administration as a function in part of the
strength of legislators' policy positions in the legislature and beliefs about the administrative
process); Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatoy Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 49 (1982) (arguing that delegation resolves legislative conflicts
between dispersed and concentrated special interest groups by mollifying the dispersed groups
with the appearance of a policy solution while allowing the concentrated groups to sway the
outcome of decisions at the regulatory level); cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 140-57 (1997) (defending broad
delegations against public choice critique).
7. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 113-16 (2003) (reporting statistics on congressional overrides as part of
an empirical study of legislative action on executive orders from 1945 to 1998).
8. See infra Part III.B.2 (arguing that structural and institutional limitations make
Congress a poor monitor of presidential action).
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
[20051
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This approach maintains that when the asserted basis for the president's
actions is statutory, Congress is the ultimate source of power; its delegation is
the basis of the president's authority, and courts should insist, as they do for
agencies, on an identifiable source of statutory authorization. But within that
basic structure, the president's accountability, visibility, and ability to
coordinate policy provide strong reasons for presuming that Congress would
prefer that the president's assertions of statutory authority be reviewed
deferentially. This position thus grants the president an advantage over
agencies. The president's orders based on statutory authority, unlike many
agency actions, are assured Chevron deference.'0
The range of actions the Constitution authorizes the president to take is
the subject of vigorous debate. I This Article does not directly engage or
defend a position on that debate because it concludes that courts should not
alter their analysis of whether the president's assertion of statutory power is
valid based on their view of whether the Constitution independently
authorizes the president's action. The argument I develop for that
conclusion does not depend on any particular construction of the
president's independent constitutional powers. It does assume, however,
that the president's constitutional powers and status do not require the
judiciary to grant his interpretations of statutes special interpretive
deference, or at least that the basis for such interpretive authority is
sufficiendy weak or uncertain that it must yield to the institutional and
structural considerations that I highlight."
10. Agency action may receive Chevron deference or the lesser deference of Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001)
(holding that Skidmore, not Chevron, deference is applicable to a United States Customs Service
tariff ruling). Under Skidmore, agency decisions may merit some variable amount of persuasive
deference in view of the "experience and informed judgment" of the agency, depending on
"the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade." 323
U.S. at 140.
11. The literature is too vast to capture in a single citation. A few treatments that I have
found particularly helpful are: Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism
and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (challenging the thesis that the Vesting Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. lI, § 1, cl. 1, grants the president broad residual powers not specified in Article
II); Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power Providing a Framework for Judicial
Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 863, 887-95 (1983) (arguing that courts should evaluate challenges to
presidential acts that lack express statutory or constitutional authorization by determining
whether they infringe on legislative orjudicial powers); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power
of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (arguing that the president has lawmaking
power only over protection of "personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United
States"); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch
Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529, 545-49, 554-76 (1999) (defending the president's
primary constitutional authority over foreign affairs).
12. This assumption does not imply that I view the president's position as the elected head
of the executive branch as irrelevant to the character of judicial deference the president's
claims of statutory authority should receive. On the contrary, as noted above, I argue that the
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The president also has figured prominently in debates in administrative
law. But those debates have focused on the president's role in directing the
actions of others, not on judicial review of the president's assertions of
delegated statutory authority in his own name.' In view of the fact that
courts should assess the statutory basis for a presidential order before
president's accountability, visibility, and ability to coordinate policy justify applying Chevron
deference to his assertions of statutory power. This claim that the president's accountability and
powers-in-tact justify judicial deference is distinct from the idea that the president's
constitutional status endowed by the Vesting Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1, as a co-ordinate
branch of government, or the Constitution's grant of specific powers, such as the duty to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, require the judiciary to grant
special deference to the president's interpretations of statutes. The validity of the assumption I
make may depend upon the resolution of the contested question of the extent to which the
judiciary is or should be the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and other federal laws.
I do not engage that wide-ranging debate in this Article.
13. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 466 (2003) (arguing that the presidential control
model of administrative law is not sufficient to legitimize agency action); Cynthia R. Farina, The
Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 987, 989
(1997) (arguing against the idea that the president's elected status is sufficient to solve the
legitimacy problem of the administrative state); Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch
Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 219 (1993) (defending presidential oversight of
agency action and its implications forjudicial review, focusing on the president's own assertions
of statutory authority); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2246-
52, 2281-2314, 2331-46, 2376-78 (2001) (documenting and defending increased presidential
control over agency action, and proposing that Chevron deference to agency action should turn
on presidential involvement); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control over Regulatory Agency
Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 450-51, 454-55 (1987) (arguing that WAhite House
involvement in regulation may *have undesirable consequences and does not increase
accountability); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 967 (1997)
(iecognizing and criticizing President Clinton's direction and public appropriation of
rulemakings). The one focused and helpful treatment of the topic, Harold H. Bruil, Judicial
Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1 (1982), is more than twenty years old.
It was completed prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision that the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the president, see text
accompanying infta notes 59-62 (discussing the availability of judicial review of presidential
action), and prior to recent empirical work on the president's assertion of directive authority.
See infra text accompanying notes 33-38 (discussing recent empirical studies). Bruff takes the
view that when the president's independent constitutional powers are present, the courts
should be more deferential to the president's assertions of statutory authority and more willing
to "draw some support for the decision from the penumbras of statutes." Bruff, supra, at 38. 1
challenge the idea that the president's constitutional powers to act should shape the character
of judicial review of his statutory assertions of authority, See infra Part III.B. Others have
examined the application of Chevron, on different grounds than I defend, with regard to
specific aspects of the president's activity, see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000) (examining the application of Chevron to foreign affairs law),
or as a constraint on presidential power. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CuI. L. REV. 123, 185-87 (1994) (arguing that the Chevron
doctrine, even strictly applied, would not be adequate to check presidential lawmaking, and
proposing a concurrent congressional resolution mechanism to check presidential action).
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considering the president's constitutional authority, 14 a framework for
review of the president's own assertions of statutory power is critical.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief primer on
executive orders and presidential orders more generally. Part II shows that,
while the Supreme Court has embraced a background principle that the
president's constitutional status provides grounds for limiting judicial review
of presidential actions and for some form of judicial deference, neither the
Supreme Court nor the lower courts have developed a conception of the
character and scope of deference the president's claims of statutory
authorization should receive. I illustrate this incoherence by describing
three different stances that courts have taken in assessing the statutory basis
for presidential orders, ranging from granting the president virtually no
deference to giving the president's assertions of statutory authority
substantial deference, and even to implying authority for the president by
aggregating powers delegated in a variety of related statutory provisions.
Part III argues that the same framework of judicial review should apply
to claims of statutory authorization by agencies and the president. This
framework provides an attractive principle of review of the president's
actions because it insists upon a basis to conclude that the president's
statutory assertions are grounded in an executive-legislative agreement. I
argue that the agency framework accomplishes this through a fundamental
principle that statutory authority may not be implied by aggregation from a
collection of delegations, none of which individually authorizes the action.
Instead, delegation of authority must be traceable to some identifiable
statutory authorization. I call this the principle of nonaggregation and defend
its difference from other, now-accepted forms of implication of authority.
Part III then argues that this principle should apply not only to agency
action, but also to the president's assertion of statutory authority. I contend
that the president's independent constitutional powers-that is, authority to
act granted directly by the Constitution-do not justify aggregating statutory
authority on the president's behalf, and that in fact the president's
independent constitutional powers do not bear on how a court should
determine what can count as statuto7y authorization. Building on recent
empirical work in political science and public choice theory, I also suggest
that the fact that Congress is poorly structured to monitor the president's
14- See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994) (affirming the principle of judicial
review that courts address the statutory basis for executive action before examining the
constitutional basis for authority with the aim of avoiding constitutional decisions); Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) ("In keeping with our duty to avoid deciding constitutional
questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case, we look first to petitioners'
non-constitutional claim that respondent [Secretary of the Army] acted in excess of powers
granted him by Congress."); Bruff, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that courts will review statutory
questions before constitutional questions to avoid making a constitutional decision).
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compliance with statutory delegations justifies requiring some identifiable
statutory source as a basis for the president's actions.
Part IV argues that Chevron deference should apply to the president's
assertion of a qualifying statutory source of authority. In view of the
president's status, visibility, and accountability, as well as the transparency of
presidential orders, I suggest that the grounds that support the application
of Chevron to the president's orders are even stronger than the grounds that
support Chevron's application to agency action. This argument also
demonstrates a problem with the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Mead Corp.,15 the Court's most important decision on the scope of
Chevron's application. The Mead Court focused on whether the agency was
required to act with procedural formality, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking, as the primary trigger for Chevron deference.' 6 Delegations to
the president, however, do not require the president to act with procedural
formality. The application of Chevron to the president requires adjustment of
the Mead principle, and suggests grounds for revision that dovetail with
recent critical commentary on Mead. In this way, the statutory president is
not only subject to, but also helps to clarify the demands of administrative
law.
By distinguishing the president's constitutional powers from the
question of his statutory authority, this conception of judicial review insists
that courts validate a president's assertion of statutory power only if there
are good grounds to believe that it reflects the agreement of the legislature
and the executive. In this way, the theory emphasizes Congress's political
accountability as the source of the statutory president's power. At the same
time, the theory acknowledges that the president's superior political
accountability to the judiciary justifies according deference to his
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions. Thus, at each level, the
theory structures the judicial role to require that political accountability be
the basis for political power.
I. PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Before turning to these arguments, this Part provides a brief primer on
presidential orders: what they are, their scope of use, their legal status, the
legal requirements the president must satisfy before issuing them, and the
availability ofjudicial review.
What are executive and other presidential orders? American law provides no
definition of executive orders.' Nor are there legal requirements on the
15. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
16. Id. at 229-31.
17. There is no current statutory definition of executive orders. The Federal Register Act
of 1935, 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000), establishes publication requirements for executive orders and
proclamations, but provides no definition of what an executive order or proclamation is.
[20051
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types of directives that the president must issue as an executive order, as
opposed to other headings, such as a proclamation, memorandum,
directive, or determination. Further, the particular form in which a directive
is conveyed does not determine its legal effect, and may reflect nothing
more than a bureaucratic choice.1 8 For these reasons, I refer to executive
orders along with these other forms of written presidential directives as
"presidential orders" and define each simply as written directives that the
president designates as such.19
Several executive orders have established procedures for issuing executive orders, see infra note
55, but none include a definition. In 1999, a bill introduced before a House committee
included the following definition of a "presidential order": "(1) any executive order,
Presidential proclamation, or Presidential directive or (2) any other Presidential or Executive
action whatever name described purporting to have prescriptive effect that is issued under the
authority of the President or any other officer or employee of the executive branch."
Presidential Order Limitation Act of 1999, H.R. 3131, 106th Cong. After a hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, no further action was taken on
the bill. See Congressional Limitation of Execttive Orders: flearing on HR. 3131, H. Con. Res. 30, and
HR. 2655 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 8-67 (1999) (hearing testimony on the Presidential Order Limitation Act
of 1999).
18. In response to a request for a legal opinion from President Clinton, the Department
of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel concluded that there is no difference between the legal
effect of a presidential directive and an executive order. See Memorandum from Randolph D.
Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the President, Legal
Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, As Compared to an Executive Order (Jan. 29, 2000)
(stating that the substance of the directive or order determines its legal effect, not the form or
caption of the written document through which that action is conveyed),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/predirective.htm (on file with the Iowa Law Review); see also Wolsey
v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1879) (holding that an administrative order by the
Secretary of Interior had the legal effect of a presidential proclamation and rejecting the
suggestion that any "particular form of such announcement is necessary"). Harold Bruff also
takes the view that the form in which a directive is conveyed may reflect nothing more than
bureaucratic tradition. Bruff, supra note 13, at 14.
19. Attempts by legal scholars and political scientists to classify these different forms of
orders have been unavailing. The most widely noted general characterization is that executive
orders are typically directed to, and govern the actions of, federal government officials, whereas
proclamations address private citizens or the public generally. E.g., HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT
OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter HOUSE STUDY]; William D. Neighbors, Presidential
Legislation by Executive Order, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 106 (1964). But such a classification tends
to obscure the fact that even orders formally directed at other government officials can have
practical effects on private parties. For instance, President Franklin Roosevelt formally imposed
nondiscrimination requirements on "contracting agencies of the government," Exec. Order No.
8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943), but in practical effect established principles of
nondiscrimination for the significant portion of the nation's economy that was engaged in
government contracting. In response to these and other difficulties of categorization, other
commentators have embraced the formal definition of executive orders that I adopt-i.e.,
written directives the president designates as such. See, e.g., PHILLIPJ. COOPER, By ORDER OF THE
PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSF OF EXECUTIVE DiREcT ACTION 16-17 (2002) (defining executive
orders as written directives the president designates as such); KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE
STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 34-35 (2001) (same); Joel L.
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Modern presidents have used presidential orders to initiate many of
their most important policies.2" The president may issue or repeal prior
presidential orders on his own initiative, and in almost all cases, may do so
without having to satisfy any procedural requirements. 21 Moreover, with
appropriate constitutional or statutory authorization, these orders may have
the force and effect of law. As a result, presidential orders often leave other
institutions, such as Congress, administrative agencies and the courts, as well
as the public in the position of responding to or implementing the policy
and law they embody.
Scope of Use. Presidents have asserted power unilaterally through
presidential orders since the time of the Founding. 2 In 1793, Washington
issued the Neutrality Proclamation, which proclaimed the neutrality of the
United States in the conflict between Britain and France, without statutory
24
authority to do so. Marbury v. Madison itself arose from a challenge to the
validity of an order from President Jefferson to his Secretary of State, James
Madison, to withhold William Marbury's judicial commission.25 Executive
and other presidential orders have been the source of a wide range of
significant moments in national life.26 Executive orders or proclamations
Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 1, 7 (same); John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential
Intent, and Private Rights ofAction, 59 TEX. L. REV. 837, 839 (1981) (same).
20. See HOWELL, supra note 7, at 6-7 (summarizing significant presidential actions
implemented by presidential orders); MAYER, supra note 19, at 4-11 (summarizing the
significant presidential policies implemented by executive order, including nondiscrimination,
regulatory review, and creation or expansion of agencies); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H.
BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 88 (1988) (noting the importance of executive orders
as policy-initiation tools); see also infra note 26, and text accompanying notes 27-32 (providing
examples of important policies initiated through presidential orders).
21. See infra text accompanying note 54 (noting a few statutes that impose consultation
and reporting requirements on the president).
22. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
23. For brief and helpful histories of executive orders, see Hugh C. Keenan, Executive
Orders: A Brief History of Their Use and the President's Power to Issue Them, in SENATE SPECIAL COMM.
ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES & DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS 93D CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN
TIMES OF WAR AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY, (Comm. Print 1974); Robert B. Cash, Presidential
Power: Use and Enforcement of Executive Orders, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 44, 44-51 (1963); HOUSE
STUDY, supra note 19, at 7-37; JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 69-119 (1925).
24. This provoked the famous Pacificus-Helvidius exchange between Hamilton and
Madison over the scope of executive power. See Alexander Hamilton, First Pacificus Letter (June
29, 1793) reprinted in 1 W. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 398-404 (1974);
James Madison, First Helvidius Letter (Aug.-Sept. 1973), reprinted in I W. GOLDSMITH, supra, at
405-11; see also HOUSE STUDY, supra note 19, at 16-18 (discussing the significance of
Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality and the subsequent debate); COOPER, supra note 19,
at 122-25 (same).
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803).
26. These orders are cited in the order in which they appear in the first paragraph of this
Article. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975) (establishing a wage and
[20051
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declared the emancipation of slaves in confederate states, 27 the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War,28 the internment of the
Japanese-Americans during World War II,21 the desegregation of the
military, the establishment of the government's security classification
system,3 1 and the imposition of centralized executive review of agency
regulations.32 Presidential orders are clearly a significant source of law and
policy.
price freeze, and claiming authority under "the Constitution and statutes of the United States,
including the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (P L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799), as amended");
Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970), reprnted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994), and
in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing the EPA); Exec. Order No. 10,924, 26 Fed. Reg. 1789 (Mar.
1, 1961) (establishing the Peace Corps, and claiming authority under "the Mutual Security Act
of 1954, 68 Stat. 832, as amended 22 U.S.C. § 1750 et seq."); Exec. Order No. 13,228, 3 C.F.R. 796
(2001) (establishing the Office of Homeland Security, and claiming authority under "the
Constitution and the laws of die United States of America"); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R.
339 (1964-1965) (establishing nondiscrimination policy for government contractors and
subcontractors, and claiming authority under "the Constitution and statutes of the United
States"); Exec. Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963) (extending nondiscrimination
policy to all federally-assisted construction projects, and claitting authority under "the
Constitution and statutes of the United States"); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F,3d 695, 724-
25 (2d Cir. 2003) (providing redacted version of June 9, 2002 order from President George W.
Bush to the Secretary of Defense regarding the detention of Jose Padilla and claiming authority
under the "Authorization for the Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40"
and the Constitution), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R.
918 (2001) (establishing military tribunals, and claiming authority as "Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces of the United States [under] the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution
(Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10, United States Code");
Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2001), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (2004) (establishing
faith-based initiatives, and claiming authority under "the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America"); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982) (suspending legal
claims against Iran, and claiming authority under "the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ....
Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 22 of the United States
Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act"); MAYER, supra note 19, at 182-217
(2001) (examining the role of executive orders in civil rights policy).
27. Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), reprinted in 8A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF TI IE PRESIDENTS 3358-59 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1897).
28. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Suspending Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 15, 1863),
reprinted in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
29. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1943-1948).
30. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 772 (1943-1948).
31. Exec. Order No. 8381, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1938-1943).
32. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1993), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2004), repninted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(2004).
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The patterns of presidents' use of executive orders have been the
subject of recent empirical studies. The sheer number of executive orders
issued per year has declined from the peak it reached during the New Deal
and World War 11."4 This decline in the gross number of orders does not,
however, correspond to a diminution in the importance of executive orders
as a policymaking tool. On the contrary, the significance of the president's
assertions of authority through executive and other presidential orders has
increased in the twentieth century. "Whereas at the turn of the century
presidents issued only a handful of important executive orders in their
entire term," Terry Moe and William Howell report, "now presidents can be
"35
expected to issue between 15 and 20 important orders every year.
Likewise, using slightly different criteria to judge significance, Kenneth
Mayer concludes that since the 1970s, on average, presidents have issued
about fourteen significant executive orders per year.s6 Moreover, the
percentage of presidential orders that apply to the general public has
increased dramatically.37 Nor are there indications that the perceived
importance of presidential orders to the president is declining.
Legal Status. As a statement of black letter law, presidential orders must
have either constitutional or statutory authorization.3 9 The simplicity of the
statement of this rule cloaks the enduring uncertainty about the scope of the
33. Those comprehensive treatments are provided by HOWELL, supra note 7, at 76-100
(charting the number of significant and insignificant executive orders issued between 1900 and
1998); MAYER, supra note 19, at 66-108 (charting the use of executive orders in five subject
matter areas: defense/foreign policy, donlestic policy, executive branch management, creation
of board/commissions, and war/emergency); George A. Krause & David R. Cohen, Presidential
Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, 25 Ai. POL. SCI. Q. 458 (1997) (providing a quantitative
model of the president's willingness to use executive orders).
34. See HOwFi.L, supra note 7, at 83-84 (chart of overall number of executive orders issued
between 1900 and 1998 showing highest number of orders issued per year during World War II
and the New Deal era); MAYER, supra note 19, at 71 (noting that between July 1932 and June
1942 President Franklin Roosevelt issued 286 executive orders); Terry M. Moe & William G.
Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 156 (1999)
(summarizing trends in the number of executive orders issued by modem presidents).
35. Moe & Howell, supra note 34, at 156. Kenneth Mayer's independent study comes to a
similar conclusion. See infta note 36 and accompanying text.
36. MAYER, supra note 19, at 86..
37. See Lyn Ragsdale & John J. Theis, III, The Institutionalization of the American Presidency,
1924-92, 41 AM. J. POL. SC'. 1280, 1288-89 (1997) (documenting that the percentage of
executive orders setting policy that affected private entities increased from single digits in the
1920s to over 60% since the 1960s).
38. See MAYER, supra note 19, at 87 (noting that executive orders are useful political tools
of the president); Moe & Howell, supra note 34, at 160 (noting the use of executive orders to
bypass Congress).
39. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188-89 (1999)
(noting same as statement of "black letter law"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 585 (1952) ("The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem from an act
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.").
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president's powers under Article II and what counts as a statutory
authorization of power.
The Constitution does not mention the president's authority to issue
orders, though the president's power to do so is by now beyond dispute. As
to the scope of the president's powers under Article II or of any inherent or
prerogative powers, over 200 years of constitutional history have furnished
only broad outlines.4  These uncertainties have generated extensive
literature on the scope of the president's constitutional powers. 4 ' The courts
also have not developed, as I show in Part II, a settled understanding of how
to determine whether the assertion of statutory authority in an executive
order is valid.
Putting aside the president's authority to act pursuant to a
constitutional power, for a presidential order to have the force and effect of
law, it must have statutory authorization.42 When a presidential order has
statutory authorization, it can be enforced by the government against private
parties43 and may preempt conflicting state law. 4 4 Such an order also may
create rights enforceable by private parties.45
40. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson,J, concurring) (noting that a century and
a half of debate on the scope of the president's powers had yielded no net results); Moe &
Howell, supra note 34, at 134 (arguing that the president's powers of unilateral action are an
important force in American politics in part because of the ambiguity of the constitutional basis
of the president's power); Monaghan, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that time has only confirmed
the difficulty, recognized by Justice Story, of discerning the powers of the executive
department).
41. For a sampling of this literature, see supra note 11.
42. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 307 (1979) (holding that where
congressional authorization for an executive order was not clearly identifiable, regulations
issued based on the order did not have the force and effect of law); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
587-89 (holding that the constitutional framework refutes the idea that, absent congressional
authorization, the president has lawmaking power); Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that the "[elxecutive [o]rder lacked the force and effect of law because it was
never grounded in a statutory mandate or congressional delegation of authority"); see also
Monaghan, supra note 11, at 10 (arguing that Youngstown establishes that the president may
invade private rights pursuant only to a specific constitutional power or an affirmative legislative
authorization); cf Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 747 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that executive
orders are onlyjudicially enforceable in private suits where they have a "specific foundation in
Congressional action") (quoting Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1338 (4th Cir. 1995) ("An executive
order is privately enforceable only if it is issued pursuant to a statutory mandate or delegation of
congressional authority.").
43. See, e.g., UAW-Labor Employment & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 366-67
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that an executive order requiring government contacts to include a
requirement that the contractor post rights not to participate in unions was valid because it had
statutory authorization); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1091 (4th Cir. 1993)
(upholding a criminal conviction for violation of an executive order authorized by statute);
Farmei v. Phila. Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8 (3d Cir. 1964) (concluding that executive orders
requiring non-discrimination provisions in government contracts had statutory authorization
and the force of law).
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But even statutorily authorized executive orders often create no private
rights. Contemporary executive orders routinely disclaim any intention to
create any right of enforcement either against the government or against
private individuals. 6 Courts generally treat such express limitations as a bar
to judicial enforcement and decline to infer a private right of enforcement
when the executive order is simply silent as to judicial review.4 7 Indeed, the
inquiry into the judicial enforceability of executive orders has largely
focused on the intention, in the order itself, to create a private right of
48
action .
In sum, as long as presidential orders have statutory authorization, then,
like agency regulations, they bind with the force of law, may preempt state
law, and when they expressly so provide, can create rights of private
enforcement.
Process and Publication. In contrast to legislation or agency regulation,
there are almost no legally enforceable procedural requirements that the
president must satisfy before issuing (or repealing) an executive order or
other presidential directive. That, no doubt, is central to their appeal to
44. See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 273 n.5 (1974) (stating that as to an executive order authorized by statute that "we
have no difficulty concluding that the Executive Order is valid and may create ights protected
against inconsistent state laws through the Supremacy Clause"); Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S.
557, 560-61 (1891) (holding that executive orders are equivalent to laws when based upon
legitimate constitutional or statutory authority). Indeed, an executive order with statutory
authorization has also been held to provide a statutory basis for withholding information tinder
the Freedom of Information Act. Times Publ'g Co. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 236
F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2001). The D.C. Circuit has upheld the retroactive application of
an executive order so long as the order itself made clear that it applied retroactively. Sea-Land
Senv., Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
45. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045, 1050, 1053 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (awarding
the plaintiff backpay for the government's violation of an executive order regarding
nondiscriminatory employment practices).
46. A statement to the following effect regarding judicial review is typical: "This order does
not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity, against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any
other person." E.g., Exec. Order No.13,284, 3 C.F.R. 161 (2004), reprinted in 6 U.S.C.A. § 121
(2004) (including provision); Exec. Order No. 13,329, 69 Fed. Reg. 9181 (Feb. 24, 2004)
(same); Exec. Order No. 13,328, 69 Fed. Reg. 6901 (Feb. 6, 2004) (same).
47. Facchiano Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining
to infer private enforceability under at executive order); Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526
F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975) (denying the private right of enforcement of an executive order
where the executive order "does not expressly grant such a right"); Manhattan-Bronx Postal
Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (declining to find an executive order
privately enforceable where the order did not provide for any role for judicial enforcement);
Farmer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8 (3d Cir. 1964) (declining to a provide private cause of
action to enforce nondiscrimination provisions in government contracts required by an
executive order where the order did not expressly provide for such enforcement).
48. SeeJohn E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights ofAction, 59 TEX.
L. REv 837, 838-39, 852-78 (1981) (arguing that private enforceability should turn on
congressional intention, not the intention in the order itself).
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presidents. 49 They rid the president of the need to assemble majorities in
both houses of Congress, or to wait through administrative processes, such
as notice-and-comment rulemaking, to initiate policy.
The only potential constitutional source of procedural constraint on
presidential orders is the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In
principle, if an executive order were to implicate an individual's interest in
life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause, the basic
hearing requirements of Matthews v. Eldridg?° would apply. Due process
arguments have not, however, been a successful strategy for challenging
executive orders.5
As to statutory requirements, in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 2 the Supreme
Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") does not apply to
the president.53 Outside of a few statutes that impose consultation and
reporting requirements on the president, generally in the areas of foreign
affairs and government efficiency, 4 there are no general procedural
5
requirements for issuing executive orders imposed by statute.
49. See HOWELL, supra note 7, at 14 (noting the first-mover advantage of the president).
50. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
51, See, e.g., Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 163-64 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
that the plaintiff was not denied procedural due process when its assets were blocked pursuant
to Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002), reprinted in 50 US.C.A. § 1901 (2002), and
Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000), based on
alleged ties to terrorist groups); see also W. States Meat Packers Ass'n v. Dunlop, 482 F.2d 1401,
1404-05 (T.E.C.A 1973) (holding that Exec. Order No. 11,723, 38 Fed. Reg. 15,765 (June 13,
1973), and 11,730, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,345 (June 18, 1973), freezing commodities prices did not
violate plaintiffs procedural due process rights). But cf Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142-43 (195 1 ) (Black, J., concurring) (suggesting that even if the
Attorney General had authority under Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 129 (1947), to name
defendants on a list of communists, such action would violate their procedural due process
rights to a fair hearing). Of course, assertions of executive power more generally have been
found to violate procedural due process. For instance, in the Supreme Court's recent decision
in lfamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), a plurality concluded that the government's
continued detention of an American citizen without granting him the opportunity to challenge
the grounds of his detention violated the detainee's procedural due process rights. Id. at 2650.
52. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
53. Id. at 800-01; see also infra text accompanying notes 59 and 92-96 (discussing Franklin).
54. Reporting and consulting requirements are present in some statutes. See, e-g., Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (requiring all federal agencies, including the
president, to publish certain items in the Federal Register and make certain items available for
public inspection); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(s) (2000) (requiring the president to
provide biennial reports to Congress on the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget's activities); Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 6 (2000)
(requiring the president to make an annual report to Congress on the status of advisory
committees); Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Enterprise Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1738f
(2000) (requiring the president to consult with the Enterprise for the Americas Board when
entering into environmental framework agreements with the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean); U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1721(c), 1722(a)(3) (2000) (requiring the
president to consult with various congressional committees in preparing and implementing a
coordination plan among federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies); 19 U.S.C. § 2155
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Executive orders and proclamations that have "general applicability and
legal effect" for entities other than federal officials must be published in the
Federal Register.5 But because the Federal Register Act does not itself
attempt any definition of executive orders or proclamations,57 a president
may avoid this publication requirement simply by calling the directive
(2000) (requiring the president to consult with private and non-governmental actors on trade
policy and take those consultations into account in trade objectives and negotiations); Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2504(c) (1) (2000) (requiring the president to consultwith
the House Ways and Means Committee, Senate Finance Committee, and other House and
Senate committees with jurisdiction prior to proposing any legislation to implement a trade
agreement); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2364(a)(3), 2371(d) (2000)
(requiring the president to consult with and provide written policy justification to House and
Senate committees before furnishing assistance and arms export sales, credits and guarantees
tinder the Act); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4344, 4342 (requiring
the president receive and incorporate advice on the state of the environment from the Counsel
on Environmental Quality into the preparation of the Environmental Quality Report); War
Powers Resolution Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542-1543 (2000) (requiring the president to consult with
Congress prior to introducing armed forces into hostilities and, in the absence of a declaration
of war, to report to Congress after the introduction .of armed forces into hostilities); North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub L. No. 103-182, § 341, 107 Stat.
2057, 2117 (1993) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 11811(e)(4) (2000) (requiring the
president to obtain advice from and consult with advisory committees prior to increasing or
waiving the nuiierical limit on nonimmigrant workers allowed into the United States).
55. Indeed, the only procedural requirements applicable generally to executive orders are
themselves established in a sequence of executive orders issued by Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson. These orders require review of executive orders by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget and by the Attorney General for "form and legality" prior to their
issuance. Exec. Ordcr No. 11,030, 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959-1963); Exec. Order No. 11,354, 3 C.F.R.
652 (1966-1970). The Attorney General has delegated this task to the Office of Legal Counsel.
28 C.F.R. 0.25(b) (2000). Important orders have been issued without complying with this
procedure, and there is no legal consequence to noncompliance. For instance, President
Reagan's regulatory review order, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.FR. 127 (1982), and President
Eisenhower's executive order placing the Arkansas National Guard on active duty, Exec. Order
No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 389 (1954-1958), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2000), were issued without
first receiving an opinion as to legality from the Department ofJustice. See MAYER, supra note
19, at 61 (providing examples of important executive orders issued without formal review).
56, 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000). Such executive orders are printed in chronological order in
Part 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations. While the Federal Register Act requires executive
orders to be compiled in the Code of Federal Regulations, it explicitly excepts them from
codification. See i& § 1510(g) (asserting that presidential documents must not be codified, even
if they appear in supplements to Title III of the Code of Federal Regulations). This Act, which
also imposes publication requirements on administrative agencies, was the product of the
avalanche of executive orders during the early years of the New Deal and the lack of a system
for keeping track of these orders and the orders of the National Recovery Administration.
COOPER, supra note 19, at 18; Moe & Howell, supra note 34, at 155. As a matter of executive
practice, contemporary presidents have chosen to publish all executive orders that do not raise
some national security concerns in the Federal Register. See Exec. Order No. 11,345, .3 C.F.R.
652 (1966-1970) (providing for copies of executive orders to be sent to the Office of the
Federal Register for purposes of publication).
57. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (requiring publication of certain executive orders and
proclamations in the Federal Register, but not defining these instruments); cf supra note 17
(noting a recent legislative attempt to define presidential orders).
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something other than an executive order or proclamation. In short,
presidents may issue executive and other presidential orders with virtually
no procedural constraints.
Availability of Judicial Review. As noted above, in Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 9 the Supreme Court held that the APA does not apply to the
president, and therefore it does not provide a basis for courts to review the
president's statutory actions for abuse of discretion. 60 Shortly thereafter, in
Dalton v. Specter,61 the Court held that if a statute commits a decision to the
president's discretion, judicial review outside the APA is not available.62 But
just because review for abuse of discretion is not available does not mean
that there is no review. Rather, courts still may review a president's assertion
of statutory power to determine whether it is authorized by statute. While
there has been continued scholarly interest in the prospect of a lawsuit
naming the president as a defendant and seeking injunctive relief against
the president himself outside the APA,63 there is a less exciting but firmly
established avenue to obtain review of whether the president's actions
exceed statutory authorization. Review of the validity of a presidential order
can typically be obtained by suing a federal officer to enjoin implementation
of the order. In almost all cases of presidential orders, it will be possible to
identify a defendant other than the president himself that acts upon the
order.64 Indeed, this mode of review has a long history: it was the basis for
review of the validity of executive action in Marbury v. Madison,65 Youngstown
58. COOPER, supra note 19, at 19.
59. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
60. Id. at 800-01.
61. 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
62. Id. at 474.
63. SeeJonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutoiy Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 1612, 1613-16, 1622-1709 (1997) (examining the prospect for suits against the president
in proper persona).
64. Indeed, even Siegel concedes that the principal circumstance in which another
defendant may not be available is when the president's action is to remove an executive officer.
Id. at 1703.justice Scalia makes this point in his concurring opinion in Franklin v. Massachusetts.
Review of the legality of Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit
seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President's directive,...
just as unlawful legislative action can be reviewed, not by suing Members of
Congress for performance of their legislative duties.... but by enjoining those
congressional (or executive) agents who carry out Congress's directive.
505 U.S. at 828-29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803). Recall that Marbury brought his suit against
Madison, then Secretary of State. Id. at 137. Marbury sued to require Madison to show cause
why a writ of mandamus should not issue to direct Madison to deliver the commission. Id.
Madison withheld the commission following a change of presidential administration. Id. at 163.
Despite Madison's decision not to appear, the Court proceeded to review the legality of the
refusal to deliver the commission, an action taken based on the orders of the new president,
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Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,66 and Dames & Moore v. Regan,67 as well as the
other decisions discussed in Part II. In such a suit, the cause of action may be
based either on the APA65 or on so-called nonstatutory review;69 alternatively,
the validity of the order may be reviewed as a defense to a criminal or habeas
70 71
corpus proceeding. Thus, as long as review is not precluded by statute,
and justiciability and prudential doctrines are satisfied, 2 judicial review of
the validity of a presidential order is available.
Thomas Jefferson, in a suit against a subordinate federal officer, Secretary Madison. Id. at 154.
The Court concluded that Marbury had a legal right to the commission, opining on the validity
of the executive's directive to withhold the commission, despite the fact that the Court lacked
the power to order its delivery. Id. at 172-76.
66. 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (reviewing the validity of an executive order in a suit naming
the Secretary of Commerce as a defendant).
67. 453 U.S. 654, 654 (1981) (reviewing the validity of executive orders in a suit naming
the Secretary of Treasury as the defendant).
68. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (providing that a person having suffered "a legal wrong
because of agency action ... is entitled to judicial review thereof"). The fact that the president
himself is not subject tojudicial review under the APA, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788,
800-01 (1992), does not insulate his actions from review in an APA action properly brought
against a subordinate official. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (reviewing the validity of an executive order in a suit brought against the Secretary of
Labor).
69- Prior to the enactment of the APA in 1946, federal courts obtained review of federal
administrative action through their equitable powers. See Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v.
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108 (1902) (upholding judicial review of an official's act based on
grant of jurisdiction without a statute specifically authorizing review); John F. Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 121-26 (1998) (discussing
nonstatutory review). Commentators have suggested that while the APA provided an avenue of
review, it did not preclude other avenues of judicial review, and as a result, nonstatutory review
is still available today. See Duffy, supra, at 148-49 (arguing that nonstatitory review was not
destroyed with the enactment of the APA). The vitality of this form of review was reaffirmed in
the D.C. Circuit's 1997 decision striking down an executive order of President Clinton's that
prohibited government contractors from hiring permanent replacement workers for striking
employees. See Reich, 74 F.3d at 1327-28 (holding that nonstatutory review is available for courts
to review claims that executive acts are ultra vires).
70. For instance, in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 710-24 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 124 S.
Ct. 2711 (2004), the Second Circuit reviewed the validity of the President's order to detain an
American citizen detained by military authorities in a habeas corpus proceeding. The Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision on the ground that the district court did not have
personal jurisdiction over the proper respondent to the habeas petition, 124 S. Ct. at 2721-24,
2722, and therefore did not reach the question of the reviewability of the President's order. See
also LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIA-L CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 364-66 (1965) (defending
the availability of judicial review of the president's actions, including through a "declaration of
invalidity" and as a "defense to a criminal action").
71. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1) & (2) (precluding review where a statute precludes review or
the action is committed by law to the agency's discretion); Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476
(1994) (holding that a statute granting the president discretion to approve or disapprove a
commission's recommendation precluded review of the president's decision).
72. These include standing, ripeness, mootness, finality, exhaustion, immunity, and the
political-question doctrine.
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The picture that emerges from this capsule summary is straightforward:
presidential orders provide the president with the capacity to initiate a wide
range of policy objectives, as well as to create rules with the force of law,
virtually unconstrained by procedure, and without clear standards of
statutory or constitutional authorization.
II. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATUTORY ORDERS
In contrast to the settled framework of review of federal agencies'
assertions of statutory authority, there is no accepted framework for review
of the president's claims of statutory authority. When faced with reviewing a
presidential order, many courts turn reflexively to Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer73 and the three categories developed in Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in Youngstown. In this Part, I show first that Youngstown
and Justice Jackson's concurring opinion have nothing to say about how to
determine whether the president has statutory authority. I then show that
the courts have not developed a coherent approach to fill the gap that
Youngstown left open.
A. YOUNGSTOWN'S SILENCE ON WHAT COUNTS AS STATUTORYALTHORZATION
The Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown, and in particular Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in the case, is the routine starting point in
decisions dealing with challenges to presidential power. In Youngstown, the
Court struck down President Truman's executive order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of American steel mills to avert a
strike in the midst of the Korean War.14 The government defended
President Truman's executive order solely on the basis of the President's
constitutional powers; it did not argue that President Truman's order had
statutory authorization.7Justice Black's majority opinion briskly rejected the
government's constitutional argument,7 and with no claim of statutory
authority before the Court, Justice Black did not address the issue.
In Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, he proposed the now-familiar
three-part framework for review of presidential action. In this framework,
the question of whether the president acted with statutory authority is a
critical trigger, but Justice Jackson's opinion offers no guidance as to how
that determination should be made. Justice Jackson's first category is when
"the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
73. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
74. Id. at 587-89.
75. Id. at 585 ("We do not understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization
for this seizure."). The Supreme Court confirmed this reading of Youngstown in Dalton,
commenting that, "[i]n Youngstown, the Government disclaimed any statutory authority for the
President's seizure of the steel mills." 511 U.S. at 473.
76. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88.
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Congress." 77 If a president's action was taken "pursuant to an Act of
Congress," the action would be supported by "the strongest of presumptions
and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."78 The second
category-the "zone of twilight"-arises when the president acts in the
absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority. In this domain,
Congress may have concurrent authority with the president. When it does,
Justice Jackson suggests that "congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility."79 The third category
concerns presidential action that is incompatible with the "expressed or
implied will of Congress. In this mode, the president's power is "at its
lowest ebb," because the courts can sustain the president's action "only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject."81
Whether the presidential action is authorized by statute distinguishes
actions that fall into Justice Jackson's first and second categories. ButJustice
Jackson's opinion is silent on the question of how to judge whether a
presidential act fits within the scope of an express or implied statutory
authorization. What level of deference should the president's reading of a
statutory authorization receive? How are implied authorizations
distinguished from acts without statutory authorization, which fall into
Justice Jackson's second category? Justice Jackson's opinion has no answers.
This has led to confusion about the role of Justice Jackson's categories
in judicial review."' Justice Jackson's categories articulate a framework for
constitutional, not statutory, review of presidential action. For instance, as to
actions for which the president has statutory authority, Justice Jackson writes,
as noted above, "[i]f his act is held unconstitutional under these
circumstances," then the federal government as a whole lacks this power.83
This position makes perfect sense assuming that the president's action does
in fact have statutory authorization; in that case, striking down the
president's action would ordinarily be a statement that the federal
government lacked the power asserted by the president. Thus Justice
Jackson's comment that the president's action "pursuant to" a statute should
be accorded "the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation" is a standard for determining whether the
77. Id. at 635 (Jackson,J., concurring).




82. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1971)
(invoking Youngstown in reviewing the statutory basis of executive orders establishing affirmative
action programs for government contractors).
83. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (emphasis added).
[2005]
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president's statutorily authorized actions are consistent with the
Constitution. Justice Jackson's opinion says nothing about whether these
"strongest of presumptions" also apply to the question of whether a president
has statutory authorization.
B. INCOHERE-.NCE IN REVIEW
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have developed a
framework for answering the question that Youngstown and Justice Jackson
left untouched. The Supreme Court's decisions assessing when judicial
review of presidential action is available articulate a strong principle that in
view of the president's constitutional status, judicial review of presidential
action is not the same as review of actions by other officials. But these
decisions, while embracing a principle that the president is an exceptional
actor, do not themselves articulate a standard of review for his statutory
assertions of power. In decisions in which the courts actually review the
president's claims of statutory authority, the background presumption of the
president's exceptional status is frequently at work, but no accepted
conception of its character or scope has emerged.
1. The Background Presumption of Presidential Exceptionalism
The Supreme Court has long held that the president's unique
constitutional status has implications forjudicial review of the president's
actions. In decisions construing the scope of the president's immunity from
suit, and in decisions denying the application of the APA to the president,
the Court has limited the availability of judicial review of the president's
actions in deference to his constitutional status.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that the president is entitled to
absolute immunity from claims for civil damages arising out of his official
conduct.84 The president's "unique position in the constitutional scheme"
was central to the Court's holding.85 The president, the Court remarked, is
charged with "supervisory and policy responsibilities of the utmost discretion
and sensitivity," including the "management of the Executive Branch," the
"enforcement of federal law," and the "conduct of foreign affairs." 86 In virtue
of the president's constitutional position, the Court straightforwardly
rejected the suggestion that the president, like other government officials,
should receive only qualified immunity. "The President's unique status
under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials."'
Rather, the scope of the president's immunity from suit is "rooted in the
84. 457 U.S. 731,749 (1982).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 750.
87. Id-
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separation of powers under the Constitution, ' ' s and the balance of his
public duties and the danger of intrusion from private civil suits justifies
according the president absolute immunity from civil suit for claims arising
out of his official conduct. s9 In contrast, in a companion suit, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, the Court held that the president's aides, like other executive
officials, were entitled only to qualified immunity.9° The Court explicitly
distinguished the concerns implicated by a suit against the president and
those implicated by suits against other executive officials: "Suits against
other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke
separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits against the
President himself."91
The principle that the president's constitutional status "counsels
judicial deference and restraint" that emerged from these immunity
decisions also formed the basis of the Court's decision that the APA does not
apply to the president.92 The APA includes a broad definition of its reach,
extending coverage to "each authority" of the federal government and
expressly excluding only a handful of bodies, such as Congress, the United
States courts, the government of the District of Columbia, the governments
of the territories, and courts martial. 9 Despite the fact that the president is
an authority of the federal government, and does not fall within one of the
express exceptions to the APA's coverage, the Court concluded that the APA
is silent with regard to the application of the Act to the president. 94 It then
reasoned that constitutional principles warranted applying a clear-statement
presumption. "Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique
constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not
enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA."95 Thus, the
88. Id. at 753 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974)).
89. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 754 (holding that the president is immune from damages suits
"based on [his] official acts").
90. 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982).
91. Id. at 811 n.17. These same principles also figured prominently, though not decisively,
in the Court's consideration of the president's immunity from civil suit arising out of actions
prior to his term as president, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684, 698-99 (1997) (noting the
unique position of the president in the constitutional scheme, but denying the president
immunity from civil suits based on actions prior to the beginning of the president's term), as
well as in the Court's consideration of the scope of the vice president's discovery obligations
with regard to his official business. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2576, 2587-
93 (2004) (considering the vice president's constitutional status in evaluating his discovery
obligations).
92. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2000).
94. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-01.
95. Id.
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president's actions, unlike those of an agency or executive branch official,
may not be reviewed for abuse of discretion.6
In decisions that review the president's actions to determine whether
they exceed the authority granted by statute, 7 courts generally have treated
the president's assertions of statutory authority with "deference and
restraint."98 But they have not settled on the character or scope of this
deference. Rather, I identify court decisions that reflect three different
approaches to the standard of review, which range from granting the
president virtually no deference to upholding the president's action without
being able to identify which statute provides the congressional
authorization. My descriptive claim here is not that any of these decisions
articulates a theory of review, but rather that their divergence reflects the
incoherence of current law on this question.
2. Statutory Interpretation Without Deference
The first approach is the most demanding. It treats the president with
no deference, as though he were a private litigant advocating for a particular
construction of a statute. On this view, the Court understands its task as
determining whether the president's order falls within the Court's preferred
reading of the statute. Cole v. Youngg exemplifies this approach (and does so
surprisingly in the context of the president's determination of a national
security interest).
In Cole, the question before the Court was the meaning of the term "in
the interest of national security" under a recently enacted national security
act.'00 The Act authorized the heads of certain departments to summarily
dismiss civil servants as they "deem necessary in the interests of national
security."' 1 The Act also granted the president the power to extend these
removal procedures to other departments and agencies as he "deem[ed]
necessary in the best interest of national security.
1 2
96. Id. at 801; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) ("How the President
chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him is not a matter for our review.").
97. See supra text accompanying notes 59-72 (discussing the availability of judicial review
of presidential action); see also Dalton, 511 U.S. at 474 (assuming "for sake of argument that
some claims that the President has violated a statutory mandate are judicially reviewable
outside" the APA); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(concluding that the President's claim that the Procurement Act authorized his executive order
prohibiting government contractors from hiring permanent replacement workers following
lawful strikes was reviewable).
98. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1983).
99. 351 U.S, 536 (1956).
100. Id. at 538 (citing the Act of Aug. 26, 1950, ch. 803, 64 Stat. 476 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7312, 7531 (2000))).
101. Id.at538n.1.
102. Id. at 539-40 n.i. The full text of the authorization to the president is:
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The Court invalidated a dismissal of an employee of the Food and Drug
Administration taken pursuant to an executive order that extended the
summary dismissal procedures to all departments of government."" The
executive order tracked the language of the statute, requiring a
determination that the employee's retention was not "clearly consistent with
the interests of national security" to apply the summary dismissal
procedures. 104 But, according to the Court, that was not enough: the statute




The fact that the central term "national security" was not defined in the
Act did not signal to the Court that this was an occasion for deference to the
president's view.1  Rather, the Court supported its construction with a
variety of tools of statutory interpretation, including the language of the
Act, 10 its legislative purpose, 1°8 and its legislative history.1°9 For instance, the
Court found "virtually conclusive" the fact that the Act initially did not
expressly apply to all agencies, but only to eleven agencies concerned with
national defense.110 This limitation, the Court inferred, signaled Congress's
intention to provide the summary procedure only for employees engaged in
sensitive positions." In addition, the Court reasoned that there is an
"obvious" justification for summary suspension when the employee occupies
a "sensitive" position, but no justification where the employee does not
occupy such a position. 1 2 The Court thus read the statute to require an
express determination that the employee's job affected interests in national
security, which the executive order lacked.
The provisions of this Act shall apply to such other departments and
agencies of the Government as the President may, from time to time,
deem necessary in the best interests of national security. If any
departments or agencies are included by the President, he shall so
report to the Committees on the Armed Services of the Congress.
Id. (quoting the Act).
103. See id. at 542-43.
104. Cole, 351 U.S. at 551-52 (quoting Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (2000), as amended by Exec. Order No. 10,491, 3 C.F.R. 973 (1949-
1953), reprinted in5 U.S.C. §7311 (2000)).
105. See id. at 556.
106. See id. at 544.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 544-45 (arguing that Congress's specification of eleven named agencies
precluded an inclusive definition of "national security" applicable to all agencies); see also id. at
545 (concluding that the statutory limit was especially significant given that President
Eisenhower had alieady established a loyalty program applicable to all employees).
109. See Cole, 351 U.S. at 550-51 (citing legislative history that Congress intended to
authorize dismissal only for those employees with access to confidential material).
110. Id. at 544.
111. Seeid. at 544-45.
112. Id. at 546.
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What is important about Cole is not the answer it reached, but the
question the Court took itself to be asking. The Court's analysis reveals that
it was asking itself what was the best reading of the Act. The possibility of
deference to the president's construction of that Act simply did not arise.
The Court placed the president's interpretive position on par with that of a
private litigant, but did not articulate a basis for doing so.
3. Unstructured Deference
Most decisions are not so demanding. In fact, the most common
approach insists upon a statutory basis for the president's action, but
generously construes grants of authority in the president's favor. Some of
these decisions adopt lenient tests, and others have adopted generous
interpretations without articulating the character of deference to be
accorded to the president. Although these decisions are deferential, these
decisions provide no general framework for evaluating the president's
assertions of statutory powers.
a. Express Statute-Specific Deference
One of the best examples of a deferential statutory test is the courts'
interpretation of the president's power under the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 ("Procurement Act"). 1. The Act
includes a broad authorization of power to the president, providing that the
president "may prescribe such policies and directives, not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act, as he shall deem necessary to effectuate the
provisions of Act."' 14 Presidents have invoked this authorization to initiate a
wide range of policies, from imposing wage and price controls' 5 to
requiring government contractors to post a statement of workers' rights not
to participate in a union." 6 In a line of decisions spanning three decades,
the courts of appeals have sustained presidential orders under the
Procurement Act so long as the president could point to some "nexus"
between the order and the values of economy and efficiency, the broad
purposes of the Procurement Act." 7 In these decisions, this "nexus" test has
functioned as a deferential form of rationality review.
113. Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63 Stat. 377 (1949) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
40 and 41 U.S.C.).
114. Id. § 205(a) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C.A. § 121(a) (2004)).
115. Exec. Order No. 12,092, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1978).
116. Exec. Order No. 13,201, 3 C.F.R. 754 (2001), reprinted in 41 U.S.C.A. § 254 (2004).
117. See 40 U.S.C. § 501 (formerly codified at 40 U.S.C. § 481) (directing the Administrator
of General Services to act to the extent his or her actions are "advantageous to the Federal
Government in terms of economy, efficiency, or service"); see also AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d
784, 788 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that the words "economy" and "efficiency" recur
throughout the legislative history of the act).
HeinOnline  -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 563 2004-2005
90 IOWA LAWREVIEW
The leading case, AFL-CIO v. Kahn,"8 upheld an executive order that
required certain federal contractors to comply with wage and price controls
by applying what amounted to a rational basis test to the executive order.' 9
The district court had balked at the suggestion that the executive order
promoted economy and efficiency, noting that the order would require
diverting government contracts away from low bidders who were not in
compliance with the order's wage and price standards. 120 The D.C. Circuit
reversed, finding a connection between the executive order and the
purposes of efficiency and economy in the Act. 2 ' The court acknowledged
that the executive order would lead occasionally to a low bidder being
denied a government contract. But, the court reasoned, there was a
rational basis for the order. If "compliance with the wage and price
standards is widespread," the court suggested, "a corresponding reduction
(or more gentle increase) in the Government's expenses should take
place." 23 The court found "every reason to anticipate" that general
compliance with these standards "throughout the economy" (not just with
federal contractors) would take hold. 1 4 The court's reasoning was one step
more general. If the wage and price restraint program "is effective in slowing
down inflation in the economy as a whole," the court posited, the
government will face lower costs in the future than it would have without the
program. 2 5 On this basis, the court concluded that there was a "sufficiently
close nexus" between the executive order and the values of economy and
efficiency to find that the order was authorized by the Act. 126
The D.C. Circuit recently demonstrated the breadth of Kahn's
deferential approach in UAW-Labor Employment & Training Corp. v. Chao.
127
In Chao, the court upheld an executive order of President George W. Bush
under the Procurement Act that required all government contractors and
subcontractors to post notices in all of their facilities informing employees of
118. 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
119. Id. at 786-87 (overruling the district court's order enjoining the enforcement of Exec.
Order No. 12,092, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1978)).
120. See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792 (noting the district court's alarm at the prospect of
government contracts being diverted from low bidders); see also AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp.
88, 95 (D.D.C. 1979) ("[Tlhe government, in the name of 'economy,' will be forced to pass
over the low bidder in order to do business with an adherent to the wage guidelines.").
121. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792.
122. See id. (noting that such a result "could be an unwarranted drain on the public fisc").
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 793.
126. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792; see also id. at 793 (concluding that the executive order is "in
accord with the 'economy and efficiency' touchstone of the FPASA").
127. 325 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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their rights not to join a union or pay dues unrelated to their employment
representation. 2 "
In defense of the order, the government argued that when workers are
better informed of their rights, including their rights under the labor laws,
"their productivity is enhanced." 12 The "availability of such a workforce," the
government suggested, "facilitates the efficient and economical competition
of its procurement contracts." 30 The court was not impressed by this
argument, but upheld the order nonetheless. The connection between the
order and the values of efficiency and economy, the court suggested, "may
seem attenuated" and, indeed, "one can with a straight face advance an
argument claiming opposite effects or no effects at all."' 3' But that was not
sufficient to invalidate the order. "[I] n Kahn, too, there was a rather obvious
case that the order might in fact increase procurement costs (as it plainly
did in the short run); under Kahn's lenient standards, there is enough of a
nexus.
Like Cole, these decisions reflect the courts' understanding of their task
as one of interpreting a statutory authorization. But they depart from Cole in
that they articulate and apply a test that gives substantial leeway to the
president's claims of authorization. These decisions strain to find a rational
basis that could connect the president's order and the purposes of the Act.
If the Court in Cole had adopted a similar approach, surely it could have
found some rational connection between national security and the job of a
food and drug inspector. That connection hardly seems more attenuated
than the inferences supporting Kahn or UAWv. Chao.
b. Unarticulated Deference
In other lines of decision, courts have generously interpreted express
statutory authorizations, but have done so without explicit acknowledgment
or discussion of whether deference to the President was part of the analysis.
The courts' treatment of the president's powers under the Antiquities
Act illustrates this approach. 133 The Act grants the president power to create
128. Id. at 366-67 (upholding Exec. Order No. 13,201, 3 C.F.R. 754 (2001), reprinted in
U.S.C.A. § 254 (2004)).
129. Id. at 366 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,201, 3 C.F.R. 754 (2001), reprinted in U.S.C.A. §
254 (2004)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 366-67.
132. Chao, 325 F.3d at 367. Bit cf Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1330-31
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that there is not a sufficient nexus between the requirements of an
executive order that federal contractors refuse to hire permanent replacement workers during
strikes and values of efficiency and economy to uphold the executive order); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that there is not a sufficient
nexus with efficiency and economy to apply affirmative action programs established by
executive order to providers of workers compensation insurance to the government).
133. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2000).
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national monuments on federally-owned land by proclamation.1
34
Specifically, the Act authorizes the president to declare "historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific
interest" as national monuments, reserving the smallest "parcels of land"
compatible with management of "the objects to be protected."'' 35 Based on
this grant of authority, the Supreme Court has upheld presidential orders
reserving as part of a national monument waters and submerged lands
underlying portions of the Pacific Ocean, 6 as well as unappropriated
groundwater underlying a national monument. 37 In these decisions, the
Court furnished a broad construction of the statutory authorization-
including submerged lands and waters within the reservation of "parcels of
land"-but did not acknowledge or suggest that the broad interpretation
stems from a principle of deference to the president.
These decisions, as well as those articulating statute-specific tests, treat
the president's assertion of statutory authority as an occasion for deference.
But they provide no general conception of the scope of that deference. In
this regard, they reflect a variability that is similar to the Court's approach to
deference to agencies prior to its decision in Chevron.
4. Statutory Authority Implied by Aggregation
Whereas the first two approaches share the idea that the president's
statutory authority must be traceable to some identifiable statutory
enactment, the Court also has upheld a presidential assertion of statutory
power in the conceded absence of any particular statute authorizing the
president's action. Dames & Moore v. Regan is the most famous example.
13
8
Dames & Moore arose from Presidents Carter's and Reagan's resolution
of the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979. As part of an executive agreement with
Iran, President Reagan issued an executive order that suspended all legal
claims pending against the government of Iran in domestic courts.3 The
134. Id. § 431.
135. Id.
136. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33-34 (1947); see also United States v.
California, 436 U.S. 32, 36 n.9 (1978) (noting that the Court had extended the Antiquities Act
to submerged lands, even though the Act refers to "lands").
137. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976).
138. 453 U.S. 654 (1981); see also Contractors Ass'n. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d
Cir. 1971) (concluding that the president's executive orders were authorized unless they were
prohibited by statute).
139. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665-66; Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982). As
part of the agreement with Iran, President Carter also issued several executive orders that
nullified all attachments of Iranian government assets. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. In Dames
& Moore, the Court found express statutory authorization for these orders under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act § 202, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1977). Id. at
675. That conclusion has also been the subject of criticism. See Lee R. Marks & John C. Grabow,
The President's Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence,
[20051
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order claimed authority under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act ("IEEPA") and the Hostage Act. 140 The Court specifically
concluded that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act authorized the
president to suspend claims pending in American courts. 41 But the Court
rejected the suggestion that these statutes were therefore irrelevant to
determining whether the president's assertion of statutory power was
authorized. The Court reasoned that "the enactment of legislation closely
related to the question of the President's authority in a particular case
' 142
may indicate "congressional acceptance of a broad scope of presidential
action. " 143 In other words, the Court took the "general tenor" of legislation
in the area of law as a basis to imply congressional acceptance of the
president's actions. 44 The Court also found a history of congressional
acquiescence in similar presidential actions, and concluded that this was an
indication of Congress's acceptance of the president's assertion of power. 45
Finally, the Court noted that the president's orders pertained to foreign
affairs, an area of policy in which the Court grants the president particularly
deferential review.
146
The most starding aspect of Dames & Moore is that the Court aggregated
delegations of statutory authority to find a power that it could not trace to
any individual authorization, or even to any interlocking set of
authorizations. The Court held that these delegations in related areas, in
combination with Congress's past acceptance of similar executive practice,
amounted to a "congressional authorization" of the president's action.
4 7
This mode of review effectively applies "the strongest of presumptions
and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation," which Justice Jackson
proposes for constitutional review of the president's actions authorized by
statute 148 to the question of whether the president's claim of statutory
authorization is valid. This approach does more than simply evaluate
deferentially a president's claim that his order falls within an arguable
68 CORNELL L. REv. 68, 76-83 (1982) (arguing that the Court's interpretation of IEEPA allows
the president to transfer assets without any statutory safeguards to American creditors contrary
to the purposes of the Act).
140. See Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982) (claiming authority under IEEPA §
202, 50 U.S.C. § 12702 (1977), and the Hostage Act § 9, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1989)).
141. Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 677.
142. Id. at 678.
143. Id. at 677.
144. Id. at 678.
145. See id. at 678-83 (noting several instances of congressional acquiescence in the
president's assertion of settlement authority in the foreign affairs context).
146. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (stating that congressional failure to delegate
authority does not necessarily indicate disapproval "in the areas of foreign policy and national
security").
147. See id. at 686.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
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statutory authorization. It aggregates statutory delegations, none of which
individually provide support for the president's action. Far from asking what
is the best reading of express statutory provisions, as the Court did in Cole, or
even generously construing identifiable statutory delegations, as the court
did in Kahn, this approach treats indications of likely congressional consent
as statutory authorization.
49
Together these decisions show that though courts generally embrace a
background presumption that the president's constitutional status makes
judicial review of his statutory actions exceptional, they have not adopted a
coherent approach for assessing how to evaluate the president's claims that
his orders have statutory authorization.
C. CONSEQUENCES OF INCOHERENCE
There are clear costs to the absence of any overarching framework of
review. First and most practically, the absence of a framework erodes stability
and predictability in review and gives the president no clear guidance on the
scope of his own statutory powers. That uncertainty does nothing to limit
adventurous assertions of statutory power by presidents. Without adequate
checks from other institutions, wide constructions pose the risks associated
with concentration of power. Second, without a general framework,
Congress has no baseline around which to legislate and specifically to
indicate when it seeks to grant broad deference to the president and when it
does not. Because Congress is generally a poor monitor of the president's
direct action, there are especially strong reasons to provide it with a clear
default framework forjudicial review against which it can legislate in the first
instance.15
0
149. This approach may not be far from the conception of statutory construction in cases of
ambiguity theorized by Einer Elhauge. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COUM. L, REV. 2027, 2040-49 (2002) (arguing that default rnles of statutory
interpretation should be structured to maximize the satisfaction of current political
preferences). Under this mode of review, the statutory sources of authority are regarded so
generously to the president that the distinction between Justice Jackson's first two categories is
eroded. An action within the zone of twilight-that is based on congressional silence-is
elevated toJackson's first category through judicial implication. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255,
1310 (1988) (explaining that, in view of the Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), the Court's decision in Dames & Moore creates a "one-way 'ratchet effect'"). Whereas
Koh emphasizes the effect of relying on congressional acquiescence, in Part IIl, I focus on the
implications of implying authority by aggregation.
150. Moreover, when no structure of deference is acknowledged, the difference between a
judicial decision that construes the meaning of the statute, and thus is entitled to stare decisis
effect, and a decision upholding a construction of a statute based on a standard of deference to
the president may be lost. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEo. L.J. 833, 916-17 (2001) (arguing thatijudicial decisions upholding agency action based on
judicial deference to the agency under Chevron step two should be accorded stare decisis effect
only for the proposition that the statute is ambiguous, not treated as precedent that otherwise
fixes the meaning of the statute). When that distinction is lost, there is the potential for all
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More generally, such a framework plays a critical role in process-based
accounts of judicial review. In recent work, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard
Pildes identify a deep and persisting pattern in judicial review of the
executive's assertions of emergency authority in times of war. They argue
that in emergency contexts, courts have taken a process-based approach that
focuses on ensuring that the legislature has endorsed executive actions that
interfere with individual liberties. 5' With this approach, as Issacharoff and
Pildes explain, the judiciary steps back from the task of defining in the first
instance the permissible scope of individual liberties 153 and instead focuses
on whether Congress has authorized the executive's incursions, thus
insisting on bilateral agreement between the executive and the legislature as
to rights-balancing. 54
But if this approach is characteristic of judicial review of the president's
assertion of emergency powers, and Issacharoff and Pildes make a strong
case that it is, then the question of how to judge what counts as
congressional endorsement of executive action becomes critical. Indeed,
within the general structure of judicial review that Issacharoff and Pildes
sketch, the most significant determinant of whether the executive action will
be upheld or struck down, with consequences for individual liberty, is how
courts judge what counts as statutory authorization. Whether specifically
concerned with emergency powers or not,' 56 a conception of judicial review
judicial decisions upholding the president's action to create binding constructions of those
statutes, constraining future presidential flexibility and ossifying the statutory framework. Cf
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1272, 1275-76, 1302-05 (2002) (challenging the application of traditional stare
decisis principles tojudicial constructions of statutes that delegate authority to an agency where
the agency has not yet interpreted the statute on the grounds that the stare decisis effects of
these decisions lead to ossification of statutory law, potential incoherence in national policy
based on the timing ofjudicial review, and general restriction of agency discretion).
151. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency Powers:
The United States' Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 296 (2004).
152. See id. at 297, 324.
153. See id. at 299.
154. See id. at 324. Specifically, they write,
This view, rooted in the democratic process, emphasizes that thejudicial
role in reviewing assertions of power during existent circumstances
should focus on ensuring that there has been bilateral institutional
endorsement for the exercise of such powers. . . . [This] is the
characteristic way in which American courts have approached their role
of reviewing the exercise of power by political branches during wartime.
Id.
155. See id. at 327 (noting this general feature of process-based judicial review, and
indicating that it is not their project to evaluate what should count as congressional
authorization).
156. t am not specifically concerned, as Issacharoff and Pildes are, with emergency powers.
Still, the answer to the question of how courts should judge a president's assertion of statutory
authority that I provide could function within their process-based conception ofjudicial review.
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of executive power that puts at its center a search for bilateral, executive-
legislative agreement requires a framework to address the president's claims
of statutory authorization. I now turn to that task.
III. JUDICLAL REVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS WITHIN
THE AGENCY FRAMEWORK
In this Part, I argue that the framework ofjudicial review that governs
agencies' assertions of statutory authority also should apply to judicial review
of the president's claims of statutory authority. This framework is appealing,
I argue, because it structures the judicial role to validate the president's
statutory assertions only when there is a basis to conclude that the action
reflects agreement between the president and Congress.
I begin this argument by suggesting that an administrative agency's
action is valid only if it can be traced to a statutory grant of authority, as
opposed to implied by aggregation from several related statutes. I then
contend that the same principle should apply to the president's statutory
assertions of authority, even when the president has an arguable source of
independent constitutional power. I thus argue against presidential
exceptionalism with respect to the basic framework of review of assertions of
delegated statutory authority. This argument excludes the third approach
sketched above-statutory interpretation implied by aggregation-as a
viable framework for review of the president's claims of statutory authority.
Part 1V then builds on the conclusion that the same basic framework of
review applies to assertions of statutory authority by agencies and the
president, and addresses the deference to be accorded the president's
assertion of statutory authority within the agency framework.
A. THE NONAGcRGA TION PRINCIPLE OFJUDIC1AL REVIEW
Judicial review of agency action is defined by a fundamental
requirement that statutory authorization be traceable to an identifiable
statutory source. This requirement excludes the possibility of implying
statutory authority by aggregation, which occurs when the court is unable to
identify which statutory provision, or interlocking set of statutory provisions,
authorize the action but nonetheless upholds the action as authorized by
statute. This principle of nonaggregation finds doctrinal support in the
nondelegation doctrine, but rests on broader rule-of-law foundations.
Though this requirement is not frequently articulated, it should not be
controversial.
Any federal agent, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, has power
to act only insofar as that agent's actions are authorized by the Constitution
[2005]
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or a statute. Because federal administrative agencies have no independent
constitutional authority, their authority must proceed from some statutory
authorization. As a result, "an agency literally has no power to act ... unless
and until Congress confers power upon it."
5 8
The question, then, is what can count as statutory authorization for an
agency's action. The Supreme Court has long since repudiated the idea that
an agency's actions must fall within an expressly granted power. The
Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co.' 59 exemplifies the
formerly enforced demand for an express grant of power. There the Court
held that the FTC's authority to issue cease and desist letters to prevent
methods of "unfair competition" in commerce did not authorize the FTC to
order a company to sell its assets.16° The FTC, the Court concluded, had "not
been delegated the authority of a court of equity.
161
The modern view embraces the idea that agency authority may be
implied from its enabling statute. For instance, as to the same statutory
delegation at issue in Eastman Kodak, the Court more recently commented
that "[a]uthority to mold administrative decrees is indeed like the authority
of courts to frame injunctive decrees .... [T]he power to order divestiture
need not be explicitly included in the powers of an administrative agency to be
part of its arsenal of authority." 62 Rather, the modern test for grants of
legislative authority to an agency is that "the reviewing court [must]
reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority contemplates the
regulations issued," 165 without extending the scope of an authorizing statute
157. See generally Larry Alexander & Evan Tsen Lee, Is There Such a Thing as
Extraconstitutionality?: The Puzzling Case of Dalton v. Specter, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 845 (1995)
(examining the "limited powers doctrine").
158. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("it is axiomatic that an administrative agency's power
[to act] is limited to the authority delegated by Congress."). The APA reflects this principle. It
authorizes judicial review of agency actions "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C) (2000).
159. 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
160. See id. at 625 (holding that the FTC "had no authority to require that the Company
divest itself of the ownership of the laboratories which it had acquired prior to any action of the
Commission").
161. Id. at 623.
162. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312 n.17 (1963) (emphasis
added); see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239, 244 (1972) (holding that
the statutory grant of authority to the FTC to define and proscribe unfair practices is not
limited to violations of the anti-trust laws).
163. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979). Other decisions employ different
formulations of this test, but the basic point-that implications of delegated authority must be
closely tied to the statute-remains. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Am. Trucking
Ass'n, 467 U.S. 354, 364-71 (1984) (upholding the ICC's power to reject certain tarifffilings on
the grounds that it furthered a "specific statutory mandate" and was "directly and closely tied to
that mandate," even though authority to do so was not expressly granted by statute); Trans
Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 654-57 (1978) (upholding the ICC's power to fix
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"beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop."' 64
Contemporary doctrines of judicial review, principally the Chevron doctrine,
have specified a framework in which the court is to apply this broad
standard.
But despite the fact that authority for agency action, within those broad
limits, may be implied, the framework of judicial review of agency action
does not allow authority to be implied by aggregation from related statutory
delegations, none of which include the authority asserted either expressly or
by implication. To uphold an agency's assertion of delegated statutory
authority, the court must be able to identify the statutory provision, or a set
of interlocking provisions, that authorizes the action. This is what I call the
principle of nonaggregation.
It is important to be clear about the difference between this principle
and the now-accepted form of implications of authority. The fact that courts
permit some implication of authority does not abandon all limitations on
the scope of agencies' authority. Courts regularly strike down agency actions
that go beyond the authority that is reasonably contemplated by a statutory
delegation. F5 How a court determines when an assertion of authority is
reasonably contemplated by the statute will depend on the particulars of the
statutory scheme and the court's approach to statutory interpretation. On
different conceptions of statutory interpretation, this question will have a
different complexion: for textualists, the focus will be on determining what
powers the text of the statute fairly imports; for purposivists, the inquiry will
emphasize the connection to the legislative purpose, and so on. Difficult
questions of statutory interpretation arise in determining the scope of
implied authority, but the problems it poses are distinct from those involved
in the implication of authority by aggregation. First, regardless of one's
method of statutory interpretation, implied authority may extend only to the
limits of what Congress contemplated in the statute. As a result, if a court
maximum interim rates and refund conditions for carriers with suspended rates on the grounds
that the conditions are a "legitimate, reasonable, and direct adjunct to the Commission's
explicit statutory power," despite the fact that the ICC lacked express authorization).
164. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
165. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979) (holding that the
FCC did not have authority, ancillary or otherwise, to require cable television systems to make
channels available for third-party access); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S.
316, 325-29 (1961) (holding that the Civil Aeronautics Board lacked the implied authority to
change the terms of a certificate of public convenience and necessity after its effective date
without notice or hearing); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 396 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (holding that FERC lacked the authority to order the replacement of the governing
board of the California public benefit corporation); AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 323 F.3d 1081, 1082
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the FCC lacked statutory authority to promulgate rules fining
telecommunications carriers for changing subscribers' telephone service without customer
authorization); Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that the FCC lacked the authority to require video descriptions of television action for
the visually impaired).
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reaches the conclusion that the authority asserted is reasonably
contemplated by a given statute or set of interlocking statutory provisions, it
will not reach the question of implying authority by aggregation. Authority
implied by aggregation is thus authority that is not reasonably contemplated
by any identifiable statutory delegation. Second, and more broadly,
implication of authority focuses on a single statute or a group of
interlocking statutory provisions that reflect a congressional action to be
interpreted. In contrast, when a court is engaging in implication by
aggregation, it is not interpreting a single congressional action, but rather
lacing together several disparate actions. In a sense, aggregation allows the
court to make inferences from the public laws as a whole, or from
Congress's underlying and enduring policy preferences. Unless one adopts
very strong assumptions about the coherence of the statutory corpus as a
whole,166 the implication of statutory authority by aggregation invites courts
into a more expansive range of inference, and one that lacks a connection
to the Congress's statutory delegations, or interlocking statutory delegations,
that other valid implications have.
It also should be clear that the principle of nonaggregation does not
contradict the frequent occurrence that two different statutes must be
combined to validate the agency's action. For instance, for some agencies,
the scope of the conduct that the agency has authority to regulate and the
agency's enforcement powers are defined in different statutes. The Federal
Trade Commission is such an agency. The FTC's organic statute provides
the agency enforcement authority to enjoin conduct that violates § 7 of the
Clayton Act. 167 Together, these two statutes authorize the FTC to seek
injunctions to prevent corporate mergers that the FTC believes violate § 7 of
the Clayton Act.lu The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") also
illustrates this point. 69 NEPA authorizes and requires federal agencies to
take into account a wide range of environmental values not identified in the
166. CompareW. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-92 (1991) (construing a
provision for "attorney's fees" in view of other statutory usages that distinguish attorney and
expert fees), with id. at 103-105, 115-116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the omission of
a provision for expert fees and inclusion of it elsewhere cannot justify excluding expert fees
from attorney's fees).
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000) (granting the FTC authority to seek preliminary
injunctions to enjoin mergers in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act); Id. § 18 (prohibiting
acquisitions, including mergers, where the "effect of such acquisition [will] substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly").
168. See FTC v. Staples, Inc. 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Whenever the
Commission has reason to believe that a corporation is violating, or is about to violate, Section 7
of the Clayton Act, the FTC may seek a preliminary injunction to prevent a merger pending the
Commission's administrative adjudication of the merger's legality." (citing 15 U.S.C. § 53(b))
(internal quotation omitted)).
169. National Environmental Policy Act §§ 101-207, 42 U. S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
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agency's organic statute.'17 Thus, the combination of NEPA and the agency's
organic statute authorizes the agency to impose environmental conditions
on the licenses it issues, where it would have lacked the authority to impose
those conditions without NEPA.' 7' But in these cases, the reviewing court
can still trace the grant of authority to specific authorizing provisions. What
the nonaggregation principle prohibits is a court's concluding that an
agency's action is valid despite the fact that the court cannot trace the action
to any identifiable statutory sources; it disallows finding that the general
tenor of statutory delegations authorize the action, even though the court
cannot find any delegation or interlocking set of delegations that do so. The
principle of nonaggregation excludes the possibility of review of
administrative agency action according to the approach exemplified in
Dames & Moore.
At the most general level, the principle of nonaggregation is grounded
in rule-of-law ideas. The rule of law requires a level of publicity and
transparency. In general, both publicity and transparency require that, if a
delegatee has authority by virtue of a delegation of power, the legislative acts
which delegated the power asserted should be identifiable. Without that,
neither government actors nor private parties would have a basis for notice
of the scope or source of an agent's authority.
The principle of nonaggregation has its most clear doctrinal reflection
in the nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine concerns the
scope of Congress's power to delegate the authority to make policy
decisions. The Court has repeatedly construed the doctrine so generously
that it has effectively denied its judicial enforcement.1 2 But in principle, the
doctrine requires that "when Congress confers decisionmaking authority
upon agencies, Congress must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible




170. See id. §§ 4331-4332 (requiring all agencies to consider the environmental impact of
their actions); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("NEPA authorizes the agency to make decisions based on environmental factors not expressly
identified in the agency's underlying statute."); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. United
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the Atomic
Energy Commission is not only permitted, but required by NEPA to take environmental values
into account); see also ThomasJ. Schooenbaum & Richard B. Stewart, The Role of Mitigation and
Conservation Measures in Achieving Compliance with Environmtntal Regulatory Statutes: Lessons from
Section 316 of the Clean Water Act, 8 N.Y.U. ENVrL. LJ. 237, 285 (2000) (commenting on the
authority that NEPA grants agencies to consider environmental impact).
171. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 859 F.2d at 169-70 (suggesting that the EPA could impose
"NEPA-inspired conditions" on a discharge permit).
172. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (denying a
nondelegation challenge to the Clean Air Act); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act
Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 330-35 (1999) (describing the history of the doctrine).
173. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (quotingJ.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S,
394, 409 (1928)) (alteration in original).
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A prerequisite for determining whether Congress has delegated a
sufficient standard is that the court be able to trace the authority asserted to
a statutory source. How could Congress have delegated authority to an
agency with an "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's action if the
court cannot locate a statute delegating the particular power asserted (either
expressly or by implication in a statutory provision)? Where an agency's
authority to take an action is based solely on the implication of authority
aggregated from several related statutory provisions, none of which can be
said to authorize the action, the court cannot identify the delegation and
therefore cannot determine whether the delegation furnishes an intelligible
principle. In that case, the claimed authority cannot be said to be the
product of any delegation that itself includes an intelligible principle. In
short, the nondelegation doctrine requires the principle of nonaggregation.
One might object that because the nondelegation doctrine applies only
to Congress's delegation of "legislative" (or "quasi-legislative") power, the
nondelegation doctrine cannot justify the principle of nonaggregation
where Congress has delegated non-legislative powers. My suggestion,
however, is not that the nondelegation doctrine is the sole ground for the
principle of nonaggregation, but rather that the principle of
nonaggregation derives from more fundamental principles as to what can
count as a delegation, and so applies beyond the doctrinal limits of the
nondelegation doctrine.1
4
B. AGAJIVSTPREIDEArlTAL EXCEPTiONA LISM
The argument for treating the president no differently than an agency
as to what can count as statutory authorization has two parts. First, I contend
that the president's independent constitutional powers provide no reason to
imply statutory authority by aggregation. In other words, I defend separating
the president's independent constitutional powers from statutory review.
Second, I suggest that Congress's structural inadequacies as a monitor of
presidential action establish the need for the judiciary to require that the
president's action be based on an identifiable source of authority.
1. Separating Constitutional Powers from Statutory Review
One argument for implying statutory authority by aggregation from
several statutes, as the Court did in Dames & Moore, is the presence of the
president's independent constitutional powers in an area. 175 The idea is that
174. The principle of nonaggregation is arguably implicit in the Chevron doctrine. Within
the Chevron framework, the court first asks whether Congress's intent is clear, and if not, the
court must defer to the agency's construction. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). It only makes sense to ask whether a statute is clear if there is
a statutory source from which to determine whether Congress has clearly resolved the issue.
175. See also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 769-72 (1996) (upholding the
president's power to prescribe aggravating factors in capital trials, an area in which the
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where the president arguably has constitutional powers to authorize the
presidential order, those powers permit the courts to engage in a form of
statutory interpretation that is foreign to administrative law-namely, to
imply authority by aggregation of related statutory sources. This approach,
however, effectively eliminates political consideration of the president's
assertion of power.
First, consider the asymmetry between a court decision upholding a
presidential order and one that invalidates the order. When a court decides
that a statute authorizes the president to act, that decision is extraordinarily
difficult for the political process to reverse, even if the court is wrong in its
construction of the statute. In order to overturn a decision upholding a
sitting president's order, Congress must either convince the president to
sign legislation stripping him of the power-an unlikely prospect-or
override a presidential veto, which requires a two-thirds majority in both
houses of Congress. 17 In contrast, when a court invalidates a presidential
order, that decision is much easier for Congress to reverse, even (indeed,
especially) if the court decision is wrong about whether the statute
authorized the president's action. In that case, Congress's and the
president's interests are aligned; they have an incentive to overturn the
171
court's decision, and no supermajority requirements stand in the way.
Thus, whenever a court upholds the president's statutory authority it
effectively insulates the president's assertion of statutory authority from
Congress legislatively overturning the order. This result is warranted if the
president's assertion of power is reasonably contemplated by the delegation.
Indeed, in that case, the decision upholding the president's assertion of
power gives effect to Congress's prior political judgment to delegate power
to the president. The insulation of the president's assertion of power from
effective reconsideration (at least during the president's own term) is
justified by Congress's past political judgment in which it delegated the
authority.
The same does not hold true when the court invokes the president's
constitutional authority as a basis for implying statutory authority by
aggregation. In this mode of review, the court effectively insulates the
president's action from political reconsideration, but does so without being
able to locate any statute that authorized the action. Statutory authority is
created, not by congressional action, but by virtue of the court's
president has arguable constitutional authority). The Loving Court concluded that "whether or
not Article 36," a statutory provision, "would stand on its own as the source of the delegated
power, we hold that Articles 18, 36, and 56 together give clear authority to the President." Id at
770.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
177. The same holds true for judicial decisions striking down or upholding regulations
issued by executive agencies.
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178
unwillingness to conclude that the president lacks authority for the action .
This result is intolerable because Congress is effectively prevented from
reversing the president's action, even though there is neither a past political
judgment that authorizes the action, nor a judicial determination that the
action falls within the scope of the president's independent constitutional
powers.179 This same unacceptable result would occur if the courts upheld a
tenuous implication of authority without aggregation. But the mere
permissibility of finding authority by implication does not itself generate this
difficulty. It is only tenuous implications, such as implications of authority by
aggregation, that do.
The problem of aggregation goes deeper still. Implying authority by
aggregation allows a court to find statutory authority that Congress could
not have contemplated. (Indeed, if the authority had been contemplated by
the statute, then the court could have implied it in the statute without any
need for aggregation.) This form of review denies Congress the occasion to
consider and impose limits on the powers delegated in the statutes that the
court concludes justify the president's action. Where authority is found
beyond what Congress could have contemplated, judicial review undermines
Congress's role in determining the scope of the delegation. Thus, implying
authority by aggregation effectively eliminates Congress's capacity to
overturn the president's action, but does so without a basis to conclude that
Congress contemplated the power asserted in enacted legislation. It affirms
the president's political power beyond the scope of congressional
authorization.
In contrast, separating the president's constitutional powers from
statutory review creates an opportunity for political consideration of the
presidential action that is occluded when the courts treat a constitutional
power of the president as a basis for implying statutory authority by
aggregation. '8 When a court separates the president's constitutional powers
178. Cf Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686, 688 (1981) (noting that the Court was
not prepared to conclude that the president lacked the power asserted).
179. When a court upholds the president's assertion of statutory authority by aggregation,
the best that can be said is that the president's action may have the general favor of Congress,
or of past Congresses, though it lacks statutory authorization. Unless one takes the view that the
aim of statutory interpretation in cases of ambiguity is to estimate and satisfy Congress's policy
preferences, and perhaps even on that view, that best case should not be enough to overcome
the problems created by validating the president's assertion of statutory authority by
aggregation.
180. Moreover, a judicial determination that the president lacks statutory authority places
that question squarely on the congressional agenda. In that way, a court's judgment may
provide the president's claim of statutory authority political saliency that it otherwise would
lack. An illustration of the way in which a judicial decision that an agency lacked statutory
authority can spark congressional action is Congress's response to a district court judgment that
the FTC lacked statutory authority to implement its do-not-call registry. The district court made
its decision on September 23, 2003, United States Sec. v. FTC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (W.D. Okla.
2003), and six days later, on September 29, 2003, Congress enacted and the President signed
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from statutory review, it either will find that the president's action lacked
statutory authorization, thereby effectively remanding the issues to the
political process, or will locate a statute in which Congress contemplated the
authority the president asserts. In either case, separating constitutional
powers from statutory review ensures that the scope of the president's
statutory powers follows from congressional judgment. If we believe that
government is better and liberty more secure when the exercise of political
power reflects the agreement of both the legislature and the executive, we
have reason to prefer a standard of judicial review that enhances the
prospects for identifying such an agreement and creating opportunities for
it to form. The framework of judicial review that applies to presidential
orders thus should disentangle the president's constitutional powers from
the moment of statutory review.' 8' The existence of an arguable
constitutional power for a presidential order provides no reason to endorse
the implication of statutory authority by aggregation.
Further, this analysis is not changed by the fact that a court finding no
statutory authorization may then reach the question of whether the
president's independent constitutional powers sustain his action.1 2 The
judiciary only rarely upholds the president's actions on the basis of the
legislation expressly granting the FTC this authority. See An Act to Ratify the Authority of the
Federal Trade Commission to Establish a Do-Not-Call Registry, Pub. L. No. 108-82, 117 Stat.
1006 (2003) (authorizing the FTC to establish a do-not-call list). The judicial judgment that the
president lacked statutory authority has similar prospects for focusing congressional attention
on the scope of the president's powers.
181. My argument for separation of constitutional and statutory review addresses only the
determination of the validity of the president's assertions of statutory power. I make no claim
that constitutional and statutory interpretation should always be isolated. For instance, in many
areas, there may be grounds to embrace a theory of statutory interpretation that is inspired by
constitutional principles. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEMNG THE REGULATORY STATE 160-92 (1990) (arguing for the role in statutory
interpretation of underenforced constitutional norins, such as federalism, political
deliberation, political accountability, and protection of disadvantaged groups); Nickolai G.
Levin, Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2003) (arguing for a
conception of statutory interpretation in which statutory evolution is a function of change in
constitutional doctrine); John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 675 (1997) (defending textualism as an implementation of the constitutional
prohibition on legislative self-delegation); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in tie Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. t. REV. 405, 412 (1989) (arguing for the development "of norms of statutory
interpretation that grow out of... the basic purposes of the constitutional framework"). For a
discussion of the relationship between interpretive commitments in the constitutional and
statutory domains, see generally Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory
Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2004).
182. Alternatively, a court may decline to reach the constitutional issues. See ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-89 (2d ed. 1986) (examining the methods for the
Supreme Court to decline decision); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 319-21 (1980) (arguing that if the Supreme Court finds that the president's
action lacks statutory authorization and the president defends the action as directly authorized
by the Constitution, the Court should treat the issue as nonjusticiable).
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president's constitutional authority alone.183 As a result, reaching the
question of whether the president has constitutional authority will generally
result in invalidating the order, effectively returning it to the political
process for consideration. In either case, the president's independent
constitutional powers do not justify implying statutory authority by
aggregation. 1
84
2. The Principle of Nonaggregation and the President
With the suggestion that the president's constitutional authority
provides a reason to imply authority by aggregation cleared away, the
positive grounds for courts to apply the nonaggregation doctrine to the
president can come into view. The structural and institutional limitations on
Congress's ability to monitor the president's assertions of statutory authority
justify courts' requiring that the president's statutory authority derive from
identifiable statutes, and not be implied by aggregation.
Several institutional impediments make Congress a poor monitor of
presidential action. First, as public choice theory shows, the transaction costs
of congressional action are much higher than those the president faces in
asserting power in a presidential order. To act, Congress must coordinate
and negotiate with hundreds of members, "each with their own
constituencies, interests, and schedules."' 85 In contrast, the president may
issue an executive order entirely on his own initiative, in the virtual absence
183. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 151, at 333 (showing that American courts have
insisted upon a showing of congressional authority to uphold executive action, even in times of
eiergency); Monaghan, supra note 11, at 10-11 (arguing that, absent congressional
authorization, the president's lawmaking authority is "virtually nonexistent," with several narrow
exceptions); see also supra note 42 (citing cases requiring congressional authorization for the
president's orders to have the force of law); Cf CHOPER, supra note 182, at 324 (noting that in
almost all recorded instances of challenged executive action, constitutionality was not put in
issue).
184. It is also clear that constitutional and statutory review can be distingtiished. That
possibility is a basic presumption of public law, underlying core doctrines such as the doctrine
that the courts should address the statutory grounds for decision prior to the constitutional
issues. See supra note 14 (providing examples of the Supreme Court's articulation of the
principle that statutory review should precede constitutional review). It is also consistent with
the constitutional doctrine of limited powers. The limited powers doctrine requires that federal
government action be authorized either by statute or the Constitution. See Alexander & Lee,
supra note 157, at 851 (noting that the power of a federal government official to act must be
based on the Constitution or a valid statutory delegation). Thus if a federal officer acts without
statutory authorization, and no constitutional authority is present, the officer's acts are ultra
vires and a violation of the limited powers doctrine. This fact may have implications for the
availability of judicial review. See id. at 851-63 (examining implications of the limited powers
doctrine for judicial review). But the mere fact that the absence of statutory and constitutional
authority amounts to a violation of a doctrine of constitutional law does not imply that the
question of whether the action is authorized by statute cannot itself be distinguished from
constitutional review.
185. HOWELL, supra note 7, at 107.
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of procedure,' 8 6 and without any need to obtain agreement from others.1
8 7
Presidents can initiate and respond to policies without the coordination
demands of congressional action.
Second, if we assume that members of Congress generally aim to gain
reelection, they will focus their efforts on legislation that may have electoral
benefits with their constituents.18 The breadth of the president's assertions
of statutory authority is not likely to be of great importance to congressional
constituencies. Presidents, in contrast, represent a national constituency.' 89
The result is that presidents have greater interest in protecting and
expanding their institutional power than do members of Congress on behalf
of their institution. As Terry Moe observes, members of Congress "are
unlikely to oppose incremental increases in the relative power of presidents
unless the issue in question directly harms the special interests of their
constituents-which, if presidents play their cards right, can be avoided."' 9
Moreover, acting to defend Congress's institutional power also tends to
require centralized and bipartisan cooperation, and less member autonomy,
which is also unattractive to members of Congress.
91
Third, the president often has informational advantages over Congress.
The president frequently has more direct sources of information about the
activities of the executive branch than does Congress, which must often rely
on the president or relatively formal proceedings in order to keep up to date
about executive branch activities.19 2 Further, while Congress has a wide
variety of formal and informal ways of making its position clear to an agency
without enacting legislation, it does not have the same ability to do so with
the president. For example, Congress can subject an agency to extensive
appropriations hearings, frequent reports, and intensive testimony from
agency officials. 93 These ways of policing agency compliance with
congressional policy are either unavailable to Congress with regard to the
president, or are available only at high political cost. Finally, as noted above,
186. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58 (discussing the dearth of enforceable
procedural requirements for the issuance of an executive order).
187. See HOWELL, supra note 7, at 107 (noting that, unlike Congress, the president is "free
to set policy on his own").
188. See id. at 108 (arguing that when members of Congress decide to challenge the
president on an issue they "must always weigh the attendant electoral costs and benefits").
189. For a compact judicial expression of this, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S, 52, 123
(1926), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,948 (1983).
190. Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 443, 454 (Michael Nelson ed., 6th ed. 2000).
191. See id. (noting that members of Congress have strong incentives to defend their
constituents' concerns and to maintain member autonomy).
192. HOWELL, supra note 7, at 101.
193. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 211, 234-36
(rev. 10th ed. 2003) (discussing congressional oversight of agency action, particularly through
the use of the appropriations power).
[20051
HeinOnline  -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 580 2004-2005
THE STA TUTORY PRESIDENT
legislation to overrule an order of a sitting president would likely require a
veto-proof supermajority.
These related institutional difficulties make the possibility of Congress
actively policing the president's assertion of statutory authority unlikely.
Contemporary history, as noted at the outset, bears this OUt. 1 4 If the
prospect of Congress overturning executive orders is slim and the costs of
more informal monitoring of presidential action high, then the judiciary has
a vital role to play in reviewing the statutory basis of the president's orders.
By requiring that the statutory authority of a presidential order be
identifiable in at least one statute or set of interlocking statutory provisions,
the judiciary constrains the scope of presidential assertions of statutory
authority. It ensures that the president's claims of statutory power are
reasonably contemplated by the delegations the president invokes. This
ensures that the statutory president's power follows from congressional
consideration. Of course, if Congress wishes to grant the president broader
statutory authority, it is always free to do so. And if Congress wishes to
preclude judicial review of the statutory basis for the president's power, it
may do that as well. 195 But because Congress itself is poorly situated to
monitor actively the president's assertions of power, the task rests
fundamentally with the judiciary. 1
6
Requiring that delegated authority be reducible to an identifiable act of
delegation or interlocking authorizing provisions does not impose
unnecessary inflexibility on the president. In a gendine emergency, the
president is likely to act without detailed consideration of the legal basis for
his action. In such cases, Congress may always pass legislation that explicitly
and retroactively authorizes the action. At least then, more than one
institution of government has endorsed the course of action. Moreover,
compliance with the nonaggregation principle could hardly be said to
hamstring the executive. It rather insists that judicial validation depends
upon an arguable basis from which the court could conclude that both the
194. See text accompanying supra note 7 (noting the infrequency of congressional override
of executive orders).
195. See text accompanying supra note 71 (discussing preclusion ofjudicial review).
196. Further, the rule-of-law commitments of transparency and publicity that are part of the
basis of the principle of nonaggregation apply with equal force to the delegations to tie
president. The president's constitutional status does not provide a general exception to these
basic requirements of transparency and publicity. Of course, there may be areas, such as
questions of national security, in which we will tolerate sacrifices of the values of transparency
and publicity. But the fact that there are exceptions does not undermine the application of
transparency and publicity values generally to presidential action. The president, like all other
federal officials, has only limited powers. In order to discern and police the limits of those
powers, publicity and transparency require that there be some identifiable statutory basis for
the assertion of statutory powers. Such a requirement is fundamental, but hardly a demanding
one.
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legislative and executive branches have embraced the exercise of political
197power.
A further benefit of this requirement is that it provides a principle to
mark the boundary between the first and second categories of presidential
action within Justice Jackson's three-part classification for constitutional
review. Justice Jackson's first category is presidential action taken pursuant
to an "express or implied" statutory authorization.1 98 The principle of
nonaggregation sets a limit on what can count as a basis for statutory
authorization. If the court cannot conclude that the presidential action has a
statutory source without implying authority by aggregation, then the action
does not fit within Justice Jackson's first category. In view of the generous
presumption of validity for any presidential act that falls into this first
category, the way in which the courts mark the distinction between the first
and second of Justice Jackson's categories in practice may determine
whether the president's action is sustained. Further, assessing the president's
claim of statutory authority separately from whether the Constitution
independently authorizes the action does not contradict the underlying
grounds for Justice Jackson's tripartite division of presidential power.
Rather, it provides one way to take seriously Justice Jackson's view that the
presence of statutory authorization makes a difference to constitutional
review. Only if statutory authority can be found without making recourse to
the president's constitutional authority (or more specifically by implying
authority by aggregation) should the presumption of constitutional validity
ofJustice Jackson's first category apply.
In sum, structural and institutional limitations on Congress's ability to
monitor the president's assertions of statutory power require the judiciary to
take that role. Insisting on an identifiable statutory authorization, or an
interlocking set of authorizations, grounds the president's action in a
congressional political judgment. The president's independent
constitutional powers provide no reason to depart from this position.
Indeed, allowing the courts' unease about striking down the president's
action to justify implication of statutory authority by aggregation effectively
insulates the president's orders from political consideration without a basis
to conclude that the authority asserted was within the contemplation of
Congress.
197. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 151, at 333 (arguing that the courts have limited
their role to checking to ensure that executive action in time of emergency is legislatively
endorsed). Further, applying the nonaggregation principle to the president does not contradict
the idea that as a matter of statutory interpretation certain statutes, such as those in the areas of
foreign affairs, may be interpreted more generously to the president.
198. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
[2005]
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C. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND THE AGENVCY RAME WORK
The stance that the president's assertions of statutory authority should
be treated no differently than an administrative agency's-at least with
regard to what can count as a basis for statutory authority-may raise some
eyebrows among proponents of a unitary executive. But the stance on
judicial review that I defend is consistent with the strongest versions of the
unitary position, as well as non-unitary conceptions of the executive. In view
of the prominence of this debate on presidential power, it is worth pausing
to explain this consistency.
The scope of the president's power over federal officials who
implement the laws is one of the oldest constitutional questions. Proponents
of a unitary executive position argue that the president has constitutional
authority to control all or almost all of the implementation of federal laws.'99
Steven Calabresi, Kevin Rhodes, and Saikrishna Prakash defend a strong
version of the unitary view. They argue that the president's constitutional
authority to execute the law includes three mechanisms of control over
inferior officers: removal power, the directive power to act in their stead,
200
and the power to nullify their actions. On this view, the president's
removal power is the power to discharge any officer or revoke the officer's
executive authority at will; 20 1 the president has directive authority over
inferior officers in the sense that he has a "constitutional right to take action
in the place of an inferior officer to whom a statute purports to give
discretionary executive power;' , 20 and as a corollary, the president retains
the authority to nullify actions of inferior officers, even when a statute
expressly delegates power to that officer.203
None of these powers contradicts the nonaggregation doctrine. First,
nothing about applying the agency framework of judicial review to the
president requires taking a position on the removal debate. The precise
scope of the president's removal power will be resolved by contested
constitutional and policy arguments. Those arguments, whether based on
constitutional text and history, changed circumstances, or policy, maintain
199. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994) (arguing that the president has the authority to control all
implementation); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (same); Gary Lawson, The Rise
and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1242-46 (1994) (arguing that the
president has the authority to control alost all law implementation)- Lawrence Lessig & Cass
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (same).
200. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 199, at 595; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 199, at
1166.
201. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 199, at 598.
202. Id. at 595.
203. See id. at 596 ("If the President may make a decision that a statute purports to reserve
for an inferior executive officer, by the same logic, the President must be able to nullify an
action taken by an inferior executive officer.").
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that the president has expansive power over inferior officers. But that power
over subordinate officials neither prohibits nor requires embracing the
nonaggregation principle as to what can count as statutory authorization in
judicial review of presidential orders.
The central question, then, concerns the consistency of the
nonaggregation principle with the claims of the president's directive and
nullification authority. Here too, there is no conflict. On the strong unitary
executive view, directive authority follows from the exclusive power of the
president to execute the laws. For instance, Calabresi and Prakash posit:
"[b]ecause the President alone has the constitutional power to execute
federal law, it would seem to follow that, notwithstanding the text of any
given statute, the President must be able to execute that statute, interpreting
it and applying it in concrete circumstances."2 4
This conception of executive power requires that the courts adopt a
principle of statutory construction under which statutory delegations to
named officials are read as delegations to the president. °0 This position
requires an implication of statutory authority to the president-for instance,
206that a delegation to the Secretary of Labor authorizes the president to act.
This view thus expands the range of statutes under which the president may
assert direct statutory power. But reading a delegation to the Secretary of
Labor to include the president does not imply that the president has any
more statutory authority under the delegation than the Secretary of Labor
possesses, or that the president could aggregate the statutory delegations to
the Secretary to find statutory authority to act in a way that the Secretary
could not. The unitary position is concerned with the question of who
controls the implementation of the law. It is a theory of control over
executive power, not of the scope of delegated authority itself.
The principle of nonaggregation, by contrast, is concerned with the
conditions of delegation. It demands that statutory assertions of authority be
traceable to some statutory source. There is thus rio necessary connection
between the unitary executive position (even in its strong form discussed
here) and applying the principle of nonaggregation in judicial review of the
president's direct assertions of statutory authority. The unitary position
expands the range of statutes under the president's control, but it neither
requires nor prohibits the underlying principle of judicial review that
executive assertions of authority be traceable to some identifiable statutory
source.
204. Id. at 595.
205. See id. 595-96.
206. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 199, at 596 n.210 (arguing that because members
of the executive branch exist only to assist the president, the president could personally order
workplace safety standards under a statute that delegated authority to the Secretary of Labor).
[2005]
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IV. CHEVRONAND THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS
Once we conclude that the president should be treated no differently
than agencies with regard to what may qualify as a source of statutory
authority-and thus that the president's claims of statutory authority fall
within the framework of judicial review of agency action-the question
becomes the extent of deference to accord the president. In this Part, I turn
to doctrines of deference in administrative law and argue that the familiar
Chevron framework should apply to judicial review of the assertions of
statutory authority in presidential orders.
I first provide a brief discussion of the Chevron doctrine, noting, as
others have, that the scope of its application is a matter of Congress's
intentions. I then examine the application of United States v. Mead Corp.20 7 to
presidential orders. Mead is the Supreme Court's most important recent
statement on Chevron's scope. I contend that Mead does not bar the
application of Chevron to presidential orders, but does not provide an
argument for doing so. Under Mead, applying Chevron to presidential orders
involves fitting the president into an exception that Mead allows, but does
not elaborate, for actions conducted without procedural formality. In view of
the president's accountability, visibility, and transparency in issuing
presidential orders, however, there are more general reasons for applying
Chevron deference to the president's assertions of statutory authority in these
orders. The argument I develop for applying Chevron deference to the
president's assertions of statutory authority in presidential orders thus also
provides a point of critique of Mead's emphasis on procedural formality as
the chief indication of Chevron's application.
A. CHEVRON AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The basic facts of Chevron are too familiar to merit detailed recitation
here.20s It is enough to recall that Congress had delegated to the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") rulemaking power in
implementing the Clean Air Act.2 °9 Pursuant to that grant of authority, the
EPA issued a rule that defined a "stationary source" of pollutants to
encompass all emissions within a single industrial plant.2  Environmental
groups challenged this rule as an impermissible construction of the statute.
In determining whether the EPA's rule was consistent with the statute,
the Court announced the now-familiar two-part framework for examining an
207. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
208. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
209. SeeClean Air Act § 301(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (a)(1) (1994) (authorizing the EPA "to
prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out [its] functions under this [Act]"); Duffy,
supra note 69, at 199-200 (highlighting the importance of the Clean Air Act's express
delegation of rulemaking power).
210. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41.
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agency's construction of a statute that the agency administers. The first step
is whether Congress "has spoken directly to the precise question at issue. ' ,2 1
If the intent of Congress on the particular interpretive question at issue is
"clear," then that clear intention governs.2 12 If the statute's requirements are
ambiguous, or the statute is silent on the specific issue, the court does not
simply "impose" its own interpretation of the statute (as it would in the
absence of an administrative construction); rather, the court must accept




This seemingly simple two-part test establishes a framework of review
that is starkly different from the interpretive tools that a court traditionally
uses when interpreting a statute. The Chevron framework does not direct the
court to determine the meaning of ambiguities in a statute; rather, it
allocates that interpretive task to the agency. Where there is statutory
ambiguity (or silence), the court is to defer to the agency's legal
interpretation of the statute, as reflected in its rulemaking or adjudication.
The Chevron decision itself nicely illustrates this point. The Supreme21a
Court reversed a detailed decision by the D.C. Circuit. The court of
appeals observed that the term "stationary source" was not defined by the
Act nor squarely addressed in the legislative history. 14 The court concluded
that its construction of the Act was controlled by the D.C. Circuit's prior
decisions under the Clean Air Act, one of which held that the entire-plant
definition of stationary source adopted by the EPA was not consistent with
the Act's purpose to improve air quality.21 5 This is a typical exercise of
statutory interpretation: the lower court took a careful look at the statute
and its legislative history and reached a conclusion based on its own
precedents. The Supreme Court effectively responded by saying that the
lower court was asking the wrong question. In the case of ambiguity, the
second step of Chevron makes clear that the issue is not how the court would
construe the statute, but whether the agency's construction is a permissible215a
one. Thus, Chevron does not merely create a lenient interpretation of a
specific statute, as the "nexus" test of Kahn did for the Procurement Act; it
provides a general framework that in principle could apply to review of any
agency action taken pursuant to a statute that the agency administers.
211. Id. at 842.
212. Id
213. Id at843.
213a. Id, at 882.
214. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982), revd sub
nom., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
215. See id, at 725-26.
215a. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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The basis and scope of the Court's decision in Chevron have been the
source of lively exchange among commentators and the Court.2 1 6 Following
the Supreme Court's decision in Mead, it is clear, if it was not already, that
Chevron rests not on separation of powers doctrine, nor on a common-law
canon of construction, but on a presumption about Congress's own
intentions about the allocation of interpretive authority between agencies
211
and the courts.
The question in Mead was whether a tariff ruling letter issued by one of
217a
the Customs Service's regional offices was entitled to Chevron deference.
The Court held that agency action would qualify for Chevron deference if it
satisfied two steps: first, Congress must have "delegated authority to the
agency to make rules carrying the force of law," and second, the agency must
have acted pursuant to that authority. 21 The tariff ruling letters failed to
meet this standard, the Court reasoned, because the statute did not delegate
authority to the agency to issue tariff letters with the force of law, and the
agency did not purport to bind with that force in its tariff ruling letters.
2 1 9
Instead, the Court concluded that tariff ruling letters would qualify for the
lesser deference accorded an agency under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.225
The Court's clarification in Mead that Chevron's scope of application
turns on congressional intent makes clear that there is no doctrinal barrier
to applying Chevron deference to the president's assertions of statutory
authority in presidential orders. The court can just as easily ask whether
Congress's delegation to the president implies a delegation of interpretive
authority as it can ask this question of delegations to administrative
221
agencies.
216. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 190-93 (1992) (arguing that Chevron applies only to
rules with the force and effect of law); Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies
and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 277-78 (1988) (arguing that
Chevron is constitutionally required); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 150, at 837 (arguing that
the scope of Chevron deference turns on whether Congress delegated to the agency the power
to bind with the force of law).
217. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (discussing what Congress
"contemplates"); id at 229 (discussing what Congress would expect); id. at 236 (discusssing
Congress's intentions); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-
Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 812 (2002) (noting that Mead ends speculation
that Chevron's basis is something other than congressional intent).
217a. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
218. Id. at 226-27.
219. Id at 232-33.
220. Id. at 234-35 (discussing the application of Skidmore v- Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944)). Skidmore deference accords to reasonable agency interpretations some added
persuasive force or weight in view of the agency's specialized expertise and the value of
uniformity in agency and judicial understandings of what the law requires. Id.; see supra note 10.
221. This clarification forecloses an objection that might have arisen if Chevron were
understood to be an elaboration of the APA's § 706 requirements on the scope of judicial
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B. PihSIDErI'IAL ORDERS UNDER MEAD
Mead specified that the primary indication of congressional intent to
delegate interpretive authority to the agency is whether Congress has
delegated authority to bind "with the force of law.",2 2 This, of course, opens
up the further question of what constitutes the "force of law." Mead's answer
does not provide an argument for applying Chevron to the president
(although it does not bar this conclusion either).
As to what constitutes a delegation to bind with legal force, Mead did
not provide a straightforward test, but rather identified several factors. The
Court wrote that "[i] t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively
formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
,,223deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. The
Court made clear that notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
224
adjudication satisfy this standard. Other factors that suggest a delegation
with the power to bind with the force of law are whether the agency action
binds third parties (the tariff regulations in Mead did not),225 or is subject to
some centralized review and monitoring (again, the tariff regulations in
Mead, issued by forty-six different offices at a rate of more than 10,000 a year,
failed to qualify) 226
Delegations to the president, however, do not fit within Mead's safe
haven of delegations that impose procedural formalities. Recall, as noted at
the outset, that Congress almost never imposes procedural constraints on
the president, and the few procedural constraints it does impose are merely
consulting and reporting requirements.2 7 None of these procedural
constraints come close to approaching the formality of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication."2 From the perspective of the president,
review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (requiring the reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions
of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions"); Duffy, supra note 69, at 193-99
(reconciling Chevron and APA § 706). On the reading of Chevron as specifying § 706, the
Supreme Court would have to reverse its holding that the APA does not apply to the president,
see Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (holding that absent an express
statement by Congress, the APA does not apply to the president), to apply Chevron to
presidential orders. But once Chevron is firmly rooted in a presumption about Congress's intent,
Franklin imposes no doctrinal impediment to applying Chevron to review the statutory basis for
presidential orders.
222. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
223. Id. at 230.
224. Id. at 227, 230-31.
225. Id. at 232.
226. Id. at 233-34.
227. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (providing a sampling of statutes that impose
reporting and consulting requirements on the president).
228. Indeed, the unease about imposing procedural constraints on the president's own
actions no doubt figured into the Court's decision that the APA does not apply to the president.
[2005]
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a central virtue of executive orders is that they may be issued without any
procedure other than that which the president chooses to impose. Thus, if
requirements to act with procedural formality were necessary for presuming
a congressional intent to apply Chevron deference, delegations to the
president would not pass the test.
The Mead Court allows that procedural formality is not required to
229qualify for Chevron deference.  "[T] he want of procedure here does not
decide the case," the Court wrote, "for we have sometimes found reasons for
Chevron deference when no such administrative formality was required and
,2301
none was afforded." In support of this possibility, the Court offered no
discussion; instead, it cited one decision, NationsBank of North Carolina v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 23 devoting only a single parenthetical to
explain its relevance. In NationsBank, the Court granted Chevron deference
to a position the Comptroller of Currency set forth in a letter granting a
•• 232
national bank's application to sell annuities. The letter was issued without
any formal process, but the Court deferred in light of the "longstanding
precedent" that "[t]he Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the
enforcement of banking laws[,] and to an extent that warrants the
invocation of [the rule of deference] with respect to his deliberative
conclusion with regard to the meaning of these laws."
23
Thus, although the lack of formal procedural requirements in
delegations to the president does not bar the application of Chevron, Mead
provides scant material for an argument that Chevron applies to the
president. Presidential orders are forced into the space that Mead carves out
for actions, like that of the Comptroller of Currency in NationsBank, that
qualify for Chevron deference without procedural formality. If the
Comptroller of Currency's statutory charge can grant him or her deference
with regard to the banking laws, it would seem that when Congress decides
to delegate powers to the president, the embodiment of executive power,
the president should also warrant some deference. The president may not
have the particular expertise in a regulatory area that the Comptroller has,
but surely his political accountability and importance provide other grounds
for deference. It is these broader grounds for applying Chevron deference to
the president's statutory actions that need elaboration.
See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (declining to subject the president to
the APA without an express statement from Congress).
229. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
230. Id. at 231.
231. 513U.S. 251 (1995).
232. ld. at 257-59.
233. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 n.13 (citing NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 256-57).
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C. DEJLGA HON OF INTRPRETIVE AUTHORITY TO THE PRESIDENT
At the most basic level, according Chevron deference to the president's
assertions of statutory authority in presidential orders would provide the
president the same deference that is granted to the authoritative actions of
members of the executive agencies and departments. But the reasons for
according Chevron deference to the president are even stronger than those
for applying it to agency action.
Basic political values of accountability and coordination counsel in favor
of applying (or presuming a congressional intent to apply)2 34 Chevron to
presidential assertions of statutory authority. With the exception of classified
documents, the president's direct action in presidential orders is visible to
231the public. Presidential orders are transparent assertions of power. They
leave no doubt as to who is responsible for the policies that they embody,
and the president is directly politically accountable for those policies. The
visibility and transparency of presidential orders also carries with it "an
increased attentiveness to the political and public reaction" 3 6 that may make
for good policy. In contrast, when the president merely urges administrators
to pursue a course of action, or to interpret a statutory ambiguity in view of
certain policies, the same direct political accountability and transparency is
lacking. Further, the president is in a better position than other agency
actors to see the relationship between his actions and other regulatory and
interpretive positions, and to coordinate a variety of substantive goals.237
These virtues of political accountability were central to the justification
for the presumption of deference in Chevron. "While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
234. The arguments I make for applying Chevron deference to the president could be
regarded as providing reasons of policy and principle for applying Chevron to presidential
orders, or as grounds for presuming Congress's intention to delegate interpretive authority to the
president. I do not make a firm distinction between these two possibilities. It is broadly
acknowledged that Congress rarely has an actual intention with regard to the delegation of
interpretive authority. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 Sup. CT. REV. 201, 203 (stating that Congress's interpretive intention is "fictional");
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517
(taking the same view). As a result, the task of determining Congress's intention involves
determining when a court should presume such an intention. Reasons of policy and principle
provide as good a basis as any for determining the parameters of that constructive intention.
Accordingly, my arguments of policy and principle for applying Chevron deference to the
president are also grounds to presume a congressional intention to do so. In this way, my
arguments are consistent with Mead's clarification that the scope of Chevron is determined by
congressional intent. I am suggesting reasons why such a congressional intent should be
presumed with regard to the president.
235. See COOPER, supra note 19, at 48 (documenting publicity attendant to executive
orders).
236. Barron & Kagan, supra note 234, at 244.
237. Id. at 245.
[2005]
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choices .... ,238 If the agencies are entitled to a presumption of a
congressional intent to grant their interpretations deference by virtue of
their connection to the chief executive, then, afortiori, the chief executive
acting on his own qualifies for such deference.
Of course, the Court in Chevron also justified deference in virtue of the
administrative agency's "greater expertise" in the field of regulation 9.2 3 It
might be objected that a generalist president does not have the same
expertise as an agency. At some level, this is of course true. Presidents
themselves and presidential staffs cannot be as experienced in a particular
regulatory area as an agency. But because the president sits atop the
administration, he is in a position to demand the informational and policy
2401expertise of agencies as a basis for the actions taken in his own name.
Nothing prevents a president from requiring the work of members of an
agency in drafting a detailed executive order. As a result, even if we concede
that the president may have less expertise than an agency-although how
much is not clear-that deficit does not unseat the strong grounds for
applying Chevron to presidential orders based on the president's heightened
accountability, visibility, and ability to coordinate policy.
One might also object that, because the president has more power than
any given agency, the absence of procedural formality is more grave. For
instance, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,241 the fact that the
National Industrial Recovery Act imposed no procedural requirements on
the president contributed to the Court's conclusion that the Act exceeded
the bounds of permissible delegation.242 And since Schechter, the Supreme
Court's tolerance of broad congressional delegations may be attributable, at
least in part, to the greater procedural constraints imposed on statutory
delegatees.244 Procedure provides a check on the potential abuses of
statutory delegations, and its absence, particularly when the president is
involved, may raise a concern about the arbitrary exercise of power.
The question, then, is whether the president's political accountability,
visibility, ability to coordinate policy, and the transparency of presidential
orders can justify judicial deference to the president despite the lack of
238. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
239. Id.
240. Indeed, the Constitution specifically grants the president the authority "to require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
241. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
242. Id. at 530-34.
243. For a recent examination of this familiar theme, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter
Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrinefor the Administrative State, 109 YALE LJ. 1399, 1402,
1416-19 (2000) (suggesting that the emergence of a new delegation doctrine that focuses on
how law is made and specifically ensures that agencies act in a manner that the rule of law
promotes accountability, public responsiveness, and individual liberty).
HeinOnline  -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 591 2004-2005
90 IOWA LA WREVIEW
procedural constraints on his statutory actions. As a matter of policy or
principle, the answer depends on the relative efficacy of political checks,
such as electoral accountability and media scrutiny, as opposed to formal
procedural constraints, such as those imposed by the APA. This question
poses one of the central issues of public law. The balance may be struck
differently with regard to different executive actors. But with regard to the
president, there are grounds to maintain that the president's political
position warrants applying Chevron deference to his statutory
determinations. First, even in Mead, the absence of procedural formality of
agency action (or rather, the absence of statutory requirements to act
through formal procedure) 244 did not imply the absence of deference.
245
The fact that the president has greater political accountability and visibility
than agency actors should register in this analysis. Second, in many cases,
Congress could choose to delegate the authority to an actor other than the
president whose actions would receive Chevron deference. At a basic level, it
is not clear why the choice to delegate to the president should defeat the
presumption of statutory deference. When Congress delegates to the
president, it knows that it is authorizing action by an actor of greater
political visibility, though one that acts with fewer procedural constraints
than most agencies. Moreover, if the president's greater power than agency
actors is a concern to Congress, 46 Congress can negotiate to constrict the
substantive scope of statutory delegations, legislate with greater specificity,
expressly impose greater procedural requirements on the president, or even
legislate as to whether the Chevron presumption should apply.247 In the
absence of some such indications from Congress, the mere prospect of
congressional jealousy about presidential power should not itself warrant a
default presumption that the president's assertions of statutory authority
should receive less deference than those of an agency.
In view of direct political accountability and powers of coordination of
the president, the general case for applying Chevron deference to
presidential orders is strong. As the next two subsections show, the precise
range of statutes to which Chevron applies depends on one's position on two
recurring questions about the Chevron doctrine.
244. Merrill, supra note 217, at 814 (noting that it is Congress's command, not merely an
agency's choice, to adopt formal procedures that is relevant to determining whether the
delegation is to bind with the force of law).
245. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001) ("The want of that
procedure does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.").
246. See Strauss, supra note 13, at 983 (suggesting that the president is more hazardous as a
rulemaker than administrative agencies).
247. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Biley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6714(e) (2000) (providing that a court
shall decide the preemptive effect of a federal statute "without unequal deference"); Elizabeth
Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637 (2004) (proposing a statutory mechanism
for more active legislation on the scope of Chevron).
[20051
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1. What Statutes Does the President Administer?
As a matter of current doctrine, Chevron deference applies only to
agency interpretations of a statute that the agency itself administers.248 Thus,
the agency obtains no special deference for its interpretation of non-organic
statutes, like the APA,249 or of other statutes not committed to the
administration of the agency.2'0 In applying Chevron to the president, we face
the question of what statutes the president administers (in the specific sense
of being the actor whose exercise of discretion under the statute qualifies for
deference). Several different answers might be offered.
At one extreme, under the strong unitary conception of the executive
discussed above, the president is taken to have the power to execute any




notwithstanding the fact that the statute may delegate authority to other
federal officials. Because this view rejects the constitutionality of
independent agencies, its proponents might argue that the president




A weaker version of the unitary position accepts the distinction between
independent and executive agencies as an aspect of current constitutional
doctrine. On this view, only statutory delegations to non-independent
agencies or to the president himself should be read to authorize the
president to act directly under the statute. From this perspective, the
248. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(framing the standard of review applicable to "an agency's construction of a statute which it
administers"); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990) (denying Chevron
deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it did not administer); Dep't of
Treasury v. Fed. Labor RelationsAuth., 837 F.2d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).
249. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (denying
Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of the APA because the agency is not charged
with administering the APA); Prof'l Reactor Operator Soc'y v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (same); Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20
CARDOZO L. REx. 989, 1016 (1999) (noting that Chevron does not apply to an agency's
interpretations of non-organic statutes).
250. Contractor's Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Saf-ty & Health Review Comm'n, 199
F.3d 1335, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying application of Chevron deference to an agency's
interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice Act); Prof'l Airways Sys. Specialists v. FLRA, 809
F.2d 855, 857 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying application of Chevron deference to an agency's
interpretation of the Back Pay Act).
251. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 199, at 595.
252. Michael Stokes Paulsen's position may fall into this view. See, e.g., Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. LJ. 217, 221,
334 n.406 (1994) (suggesting that under a unitary conception of the executive it is the
president's interpretation that merits deference, and provides a basis for applying Chevron to his
actions and the actions of his subordinates).
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president may be presumed. to administer all those statutes that delegate
powers to executive branch icials.
253
At the opposite extreme from the strong unitary position, the president
is understood to have directive authority only under statutes that expressly
grant power to the president. On this view, only those statutes that expressly
name and delegate authority to the president could potentially qualify as
statutes the president administers.
The argument for each of these accounts of what statutes the president
administers depends upon contested constitutional and policy questions
about the scope of the president's control over the implementation of
federal law, as well as upon the link between presidential control and
judicial deference. Without attempting here to resolve those questions,
there is nothing about that underlying debate that undermines the grounds
for applying Chevron deference to the president's assertions of statutory
authority in presidential orders. For each position, the reasons for applying
Chevron deference identified above still apply; they just apply to a different
set of statutes.
2. Chevron and the President's Jurisdictional Authority
A second persisting source of debate is whether and how Chevron
applies "to an agency's interpretation of a statute designed to confine its
authority." 2 5 Statutes that delegate authority to the president, whether
expressly or by implication, also impose limits on the president's directive
authority. Therefore, the same question of whether Chevron should apply to
jurisdictional limits also arises with presidential orders, and there is a good
argument that it should.
The common point of reference in the debate over whether Chevron
deference should apply to agency interpretations of their jurisdictional
authority is Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Mississippi Power & Light
253. Elena Kagan's position may fall into this view. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2251, 2376-
83 (arguing that a delegation to an executive agency official, but not to an independent agency,
generally should be read as allowing the president to assert directive authority, and suggesting a
reading of Chevron under which it would apply only to agency actions actions that reflected
substantial presidential input).
254. This view finds some support in the statement of some courts that an executive order
must have a "specific" statutory authorization to bind with the force of law. See, e.g., Zhang v.
Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that "[o]nly when executive orders have
'specific foundation in Congressional action' are they judicially enforceable in private civil
suits"' (quoting In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1980)));
In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d at 1357 ("This court has also declared that
executive orders without specific foundation in congressional action are not judicially
enforceable in private civil suits."); see also text accompanying supra notes 39 to 48.
255. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380 (1988); see
Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 249, at 1006-17 (arguing that Chevron should not apply to an
agency's determination of its own jurisdictional authority outside its core areas of regulation).
[2005]
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Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore.156 There, Scalia defends as established law the
proposition that Chevron's rule of deference applies to the agency's
interpretation of its statutory or jurisdictional authority- 7 Scalia argues that
this conclusion is "necessary because there is no discernable line between an
agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized
application of its authority. Scalia also reasons that such deference is
appropriate because Congress would expect that the agency would be
responsible for resolving ambiguities about its statutory authority.!' 9
There is little room for disagreement with Justice Scalia on either
count. Any substantive agency decision can be characterized as concerning
the scope of the agency's power and vice-versa. For instance, defining what is
a "stationary source" of emissions 260 or what is a "drug" 261 could be
characterized both as a substantive decision or a question about the scope of
the agency's jurisdiction. Therefore, if the Chevron framework did not apply
262to jurisdictional questions, it would have virtually no application .
Moreover, "the agency's expertise and accountability are as relevant to
,,263jurisdictional issues as they are to substantive ones. Both of these points
hold for the president.
Some have argued, however, that a variety of practical considerations
counsel against applying Chevron in this way. For example, Ernest Gellhorn
and Paul Verkuil suggest that this approach is too simple and argue that this
question should be resolved with a focus on the agency's core
responsibilities. 264 They advocate a multi-factor analysis in which the court
considers the relationship between the questioned authority and the
agency's central regulatory tasks, taking into account the distance between
the authority asserted and those central responsibilities, as well as the
importance of the issue and the operational effect of the statutory
construction. 65
256. 487 U.S. at 380-82 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
257. Id. at 381.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 381-82.
260. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-45 (deferring to the EPA's construction of the statutory
term "stationary source").
261. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 124-26 (2000) (holding
that the FDA lacked authority under its organic statute to regulate nicotine as a 'drug").
262. See Mis. Power, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining
that almost any agency action could be characterized as jurisdictional); cf Gellhorn & Verkuil,
supra note 249, at 1006-07 (criticizing Scalia's view that there is no line between an agency's
assertion of authority and "authorized application" of its authority as grouping all assertions of
authority into a single category).
263. Herz, supra note 216, at 218.
264. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 249, at 1013.
265. See id.
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Whatever one may decide about the merits of the application of this
view with regard to federal agencies, these considerations have a different
import with regard to the president's own actions. First, one of the principal
risks of agency overreaching is irrational mission creep-that is, asserting a
particular regulatory interest across a widening range of private conduct. No
doubt the president, like an agency, has strong incentives to increase the
scope of his institutional authority. But because of the president's position at
the top of the federal bureaucracy, he has much stronger incentives to assert
power in ways that coordinate the actions of disparate agencies to achieve a
consistent and uniform policy. The risk of presidential overreaching is not
the risk associated with mission creep. Second, it is not clear whether one
could develop a classification of the president's core competencies in the
same way that one could for agencies. The president's constitutional powers
might be a starting point, but only that. Because of the president's ability to
command information and expertise from executive agencies, the
president's core competency could be viewed as wide ranging.
Third and most important, as noted above, presidential orders generally
have a much higher degree of visibility and accountability than agency
action. That visibility will bring the president's adventurous assertions of
statutory authority under greater public scrutiny than agency actions would
receive, and as a result, provides a greater political check on the president's
266
actions. Thus even if questions of substantive and jurisdictional powers
can be distinguished-which is far from clear-the arguments against
applying Chevron to an agency's assertion of jurisdictional authority do not
have the same force when applied to the president.
To summarize, there are strong reasons to apply (or presume a
congressional intention to apply) Chevron deference to the president's
assertion of statutory authority under statutes the president administers.
Precisely which statutes the president administers will depend on contested
constitutional and policy debates concerning the scope of the president's
control over law implementation, and the relationship between that control
and judicial deference. But debate as to the set of statutes under which the
president's claims of authority may receive Chevron deference does not
undermine the reasons for applying Chevron; those reasons just apply to a
different set of statutes depending which statutes one views the president as
administering.
266. Cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982) (noting that scrutiny from the press
and the president's visibility generally provide a check on presidential action that does not
apply with equal force to lower level executive officers).
(20051
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3. The Difference the President's Status Makes
One feature of this analysis is that it grants the president an advantage
over agencies: the president's orders, unlike agency actions, are assured
Chevron deference. The reason is that the president's statutorily authorized
actions bind with the force of law, whereas not all agency action does.
Recall that Mead required not only that the statute delegate authority to
the agency to bind with the force of law, but also that the agency act in the
exercise of that authority. In Mead, the Court held that the tariff
classification letters at issue did not qualify for Chevron deference under this
second step. The Court noted that the Customs Service issues 10,000 to
15,000 such letters per year, from forty-six different offices, and that the
Custom Service's own regulations expressly disclaimed any intentions for the
classifications to bind third parties.267 These facts, the Court held, refute the
suggestion that the Customs Service issued the letter classifications with a
"lawmaking pretense." 26s Thus, under Mead, even when an agency has been
delegated authority to bind with the force of law, agency action that is not an
exercise of that authority will not qualify for Chevron deference.
In the argument for applying Chevron to executive orders, this second
question fades away. The fact that the president decides to put his command
in the form of an executive order indicates the order's authoritative
quality.269 As a result, there is no occasion to ask the second Mead question:
whether the act is an exercise of the delegated authority to bind. Executive
orders purport to bind those to whom they apply with the force of law. This
does not imply that executive orders are necessarily judicially enforceable.
As noted above, most are not. 27° But judicial enforceability is not necessary
to the existence of a norm having the status of law.
This point exposes an interesting implication for the allocation of
decisions between the president and agencies. On this view, as long as
executive orders make a claim of statutory authorization, they will qualify for
Chevron deference. This means that if, in an executive order, a president
issues policy guidance, something substantively similar to an "interpretative
rule,"27 1 that guidance will qualify for Chevron deference. In contrast, if the
agency itself had issued the same guidance in an interpretative rule or
general policy statement, it may not qualify for Chevron deference because
the agency would not be acting with the intention to create a binding legal
267. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 233-34 (2001).
268. Id, at 233.
269. This may suggest grounds for making a distinction between executive orders and
proclamations, on the one hand, and less formal directives, such as memoranda, on the other.
270. See text accompanying supra notes 46-48 (noting that executive orders often create nu
private right of enforcement).
271. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (A) (2000) (providing that interpretative rules and general
statements of policy are exempt from notice-and-comment requirements).
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norm, failing the second part of Mead.272 Simply put, the argument that
Chevron applies to executive orders creates a formal loophole: interpretative
or enforcement instructions embodied in an executive order will receive
Chevron deference, whereas the same instruction, if contained in an agency
interpretative rule or policy statement, may not.
But this possibility for disparate treatment may not be a bad thing. If the
president is willing to take the kind of visible personal responsibility for the
action that accompanies an executive order, then there are reasons for
greater deference than if the agency had reached the same set of
interpretive conclusions. In this sense, the fact that it is the president, as
opposed to an agency, who acts pursuant to statute may make a difference to
the character ofjudicial review, but does so within the framework applicable
to agencies. The president, unlike an agency, is assured the application of
the Chevron framework.
D. MEAD REVISITED
If, as I have been suggesting, the argument for applying Chevron
deference to the president's claims of statutory powers in presidential orders
is strong, it also ends up providing a point of critique of the Mead Court's
focus on procedural formality as the chief trigger for Chevron deference.
Meads turn to procedural formality has come under broad attack from
274commentators. As Thomas Merrill has noted, the Court in Mead provided
no explanation for why "formal procedure should-or should not-be
regarded as relevant to whether there has been the right kind of
delegation."275 Formality of procedure, Merrill continues, is at best a good
empirical generalization about when Congress would want the delegation to
272. 1 say "may" because the distinction between legislative rules, on the one hand, and
interpretive rules and general policy statements, on the other, see id. § 553(b) (excepting
interpretive rules and general statements of policy from the general notice requirements for
proposed rulemaking), is notoriously difficult. Under current doctrine, the distinction does not
turn solely on the agency's own characterization of its action, or choice of procedure. See, e.g.,
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 382-85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that a document styled as
a "Guidance Document" was a legislative rule and therefore invalid because it was issued
without proceeding through notice and comment, despite the EPA's contention that the
document does not purport to bind). Thus, even though the agency maintains that its issuance
does not purport to bind, a court may find that it does.
273. Moreover, this loophole has practical limits. President Franklin Roosevelt
notwithstanding, even at the most industrious pace, the president may issue several hundred
executive orders a year. Cf HOWELL, supra note 7, at 84 (compiling the total ntmber of
executive orders issued from 1900 to 1998).
274. See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 234, at 212-21 (arguing that neither procedural
formality nor generality are relevant to discerning Congress's intent for Chevron to apply);
Merrill, supra note 217, at 814-16 (arguing that congressional requirements for an agency to
use formal procedure is neither necessary nor sufficient for a delegation to bind with the force
of law) .
275. Merrill, supra note 217, at 815..
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merit Chevron deference. 7  Presidential orders, we now see, provide an
example of where that empirical generalization runs out.
The application of Chevron to the statutory president also suggests two
different directions for a more general revision of the Mead principle. On
the one hand, the fact that presidential orders bind with the force of law,
even though they are not the products of formal procedure, invites
reconsideration of Meads association of delegations to bind with legal force
and procedural formality. On the other hand, the benefits gained by
granting Chevron deference to a politically accountable agent with the power
to coordinate policy suggests that the identity of the agency actor may bear
on whether Chevron deference should apply. These different lines of
inquiry-the manner in which Congress may signal its intention for the
agency's action to bind with the force of law, or the identity of the actor
within the agency-are taken in the two dominant, opposed revisions of
Mead.277 Which of these lines of inquiry provides the best general account of
Chevron's scope is a question for another day. But we now know that any
general account must explain Chevron's application to the statutory
president as well as to administrative agencies.
CONCLUSION
This Article develops an answer to the question that Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyet 7s leaves open-
how a court is to determine when the president acts "pursuant to" a statute.
The answer has two parts. First, the same framework of judicial review
should apply to claims of statutory authority by the president and
administrative agencies. That framework prohibits the implication of
statutory authority by aggregating related statutory sources; the action must
be authorized by some identifiable statutory provision (or set of interlocking
provisions). The president's independent constitutional powers do not
justify departing from this basic principle of review. When the Court finds
statutory authorization in virtue of a sitting president's constitutional
powers, it effectively requires Congress to assemble a supermajority to
overturn the judicial validation, and does so where the basis for the
president's action in statute is most strained. Further, structural conditions
and historical fact confirm that Congress is a poor active monitor of the
276. See id. at 817.
277. Compare Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 IkRv. L. REV. 467, 494-95 (2002) (uncovering and examining a
congressional drafting convention in which the delegation to bind with the force of law was
accompanied and signaled by a delegation to impose sanctions) with Barron & Kagan, supra
note 234, at 264 (arguing that the application of Chevron deference should depend on whether
the agency decision was adopted by the statutory delegatee, as opposed to being made by a
lower-level agency official).
278. 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson,J., concurring).
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president's assertions of statutory authority. These conditions provide strong
grounds for the judiciary to require that the president's action be authorized
by some identifiable statutory authorization. That casts the judiciary in the
role of ensuring congressional authorization for the president's actions.
Second, within that basic framework of review, the president's claims of
statutory authority should receive Chevron deference. The president's
accountability, visibility, and the transparency of presidential orders provide
strong grounds for applying (or presuming a congressional intention to
apply) Chevron deference to the president's construction of ambiguities or
gaps in statutory delegations. This framework of review thus requires that
the exercise of political power extend from political accountability at a
second level; not only must there be a basis for finding congressional
agreement with the president's action, but also, when ambiguities arise as to
the scope of that agreement, the president's political accountability justifies
deferring to his interpretations.
When the president claims to act as a statutory actor-that is, as the
statutory president-his orders are subject to administrative law. Through
administrative law, the judiciary imposes costs on the president: Congress is
in charge, and the courts will insist that the president's orders be justified by
some identifiable statutory authorization. It also grants the president some
benefits: where there are ambiguities as to what Congress has authorized,
the president's reasonable interpretations are owed deference. Those
allocations structure the judicial role and the boundaries of the president's
statutory authority to accord with our deepest democratic commitments.
[2005]
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